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ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ON DEMOCRACY, THE 
MAJORITY WILL, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
FEDERALISM, RELIGION, CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS 
AND ORIGINALIST CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Philip C. Kissam· 
Count Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America• has been said to be "at 
once the best book ever written on democracy and the best book ever written on 
America. "2 This praise should perhaps be tempered by consideration of Tocqueville' s 
purposes and the historical circumstances within which he worked and understood both 
democracy and America. 3 Yet Tocqueville's insights into American democracy as of 
the 1830s undoubtedly constitute a rich source of constitutional thought-either as 
support for particular constitutional principles or as constitutional ideas that should be 
contested. 4 In a recent notable instance, John McGinnis has argued that Tocqueville's 
ideas about democracy, especially his views that decentralization and diffuse 
government and civic or voluntary associations can create valuable social norms, 
provide a persuasive and coherent justification for the conservative jurisprudence of 
the Rehnquist Court.5 McGinnis argues that the Rehnquist Court's "revival of 
federalism, "6 its expansion of freedom of expression rights for organizations like the 
Boy Scouts,7 and its expanded protection for religious expression in the public sphere8 
* Late Professor of Law, University of Kansas. My thanks to Ed Browne and Andrew Marino for 
their excellent research assistance and to my colleagues Ray Davis, Jonathan Earle, Mike Kautsch, Rick 
Levy, Phil Paludan, and Tom Stacy for their many helpful comments and suggestions on this project. 
I. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, 
trans., University of Chicago Press 2000) ( 1835). 
2. Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, Editor's Introduction to ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA at xvii, xvii (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, trans., University of 
Chicago Press 2000) (1835). 
3. See SHELDON s. WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE B TWEEN Two WORLDS: THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL AND 
THEORETICAL LIFE (2001) (arguing that Tocqueville created an idealized picture of democracy in America 
that would dramatize salient features for the purpose of persuading nineteenth century European politicians 
that democratic forms of government were inevitable and should be accepted with modifications); see also 
Gary Wills, Did Tocqueville "Get" America?, N.Y. REV. Bom~s, Apr. 29, 2004, at 52 ("Some people are 
astonished that a twenty-six-year-old Frenchman ... could write the best book on America, after a brief visit 
to the country. I am astonished that anyone can think that he did."). 
4. See, e.g., Harvey C. Mansfield, Tocqueville and the Future of American Constitutionalism, in THE 
NORMATIVE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS FOR THE THIRD CENTURY 45 (Richard Sherlock, Kent E. Robson & 
Charles W. Johnson, eds., 1995); Bruce Frohnen, Tocqueville's Law: Integrative Jurisprudence in the 
American Context, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 241 (1994); Randall Kennedy, Tocqueville and Racial Conflict in 
America: A Comment, 11 HARV. BLACKLETIER L.J. 145 (1994); John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville 's 
America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
5. See McGinnis, supra note 4. 
6. Id. at 51 I. 
7. Id. at531-38. 
8. Id. at 543-59. 
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follow Tocqueville's prescriptions for democracy and have enhanced the spontaneous 
ordering of society through the promotion of diffuse, localized social nonns. 9 
McGinnis also argues that the "fundamental rights" 10 jurisprudence of the modem 
Supreme Court, particularly the privacy rights doctrine, constitutes the judicial 
declaration of national norms that are antithetical to Tocquevillian democracy. 11 
The purpose of this essay is to explore the relevance ofTocqueville's theory of 
democracy to contemporary constitutional law. The brilliance of Tocqueville's 
insights and his position as a detached observer, as a matter of nationality, geography, 
and time, suggest that Tocqueville's viewpoint on American democracy should 
constitute a good basis from which to raise theoretical questions and arguments about 
American constitutional law, as it is and as it should be. 
Unlike most writing on Tocqueville and the law, this essay emphasizes not only 
Tocqueville's celebration of American democracy as of the I 830s but also his motives 
for writing, the contradictions within his work and between his analysis and historical 
circumstances, and the darker sides of his thought about democratic tendencies. This 
essay thus contests the recent writing on Tocqueville and constitutional law that lifts 
his optimistic ideas and concepts about American democracy out of context in order 
to support a conservative jurisprudence of the kind favored by the Rehnquist Court. 12 
This essay in contrast reveals good reasons for questioning, qualifying, and recon-
structing Tocquevillian concepts of democratic government if these concepts are to 
help us develop a useful and attractive constitutional law for the twenty-first century. 
When viewed in the context of the full text of Democracy in America, the 
historical circumstances within which Tocqueville worked, and the subsequent 
changing circumstances in American history, Tocqueville's views on democracy tend 
to support the basic principles of modem constitutional law and the interpretive 
methodology that supports them much more than they support the originalist or 
revisionist versions of constitutional law that are being advanced by members of the 
Rehnquist Court and scholars like John McGinnis. Upon a full contextual 
examination, Tocqueville's ideas justify a constitutional law that aims to promote an 
"equality of conditions" 13 in American democracy. His ideas justify a robust 
protection of individual rights against the majority will when legislative majorities act 
on the basis of mere passion and majority opinion to coerce conformity and to 
disadvantage persons of difference. His ideas also justify judicial recognition of strong 
national government powers when national actions, by the legislature, executive, or 
judiciary, are appropriate to address economic and social problems because 
Tocqueville's view of the advantages offederalism and decentralization are grounded 
in the subsidiarity principle-that government should be decentralized to its most 
effective level-rather than in some notion of fixed constitutional thought that stems 
from the eighteenth century. Tocqueville also recommended the use of interpretive 
methods in constitutional law that take account of historical contingencies and 
9. Id at 565-71. 
10. Id at 565. 
11. See id. 
12. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 4; Frohnen, supra note 4; McGinnis, supra note 4; Jock Yellott, 
Tocqueville, Judge Hand, and the American Legal Mind, 38 S.D. L. REV. 100 (1993). 
13. See TOQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 12-13. 
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changing circumstances-unlike originalist constitutional theory and its purportedly 
more rigid interpretive method. 
This essay is organized as follows. The first two parts provide contextual 
background. Part I discusses why "we modems" might be attracted to ''the ancients" 
for help in constructing our political and legal theories. Part II describes Alexis de 
Tocqueville's general project, his purposes in writing Democracy in America, and the 
limitations entailed by his project. The succeeding parts then examine the relevance 
ofTocqueville's ideas to modem constitutional law. Part III considers Tocqueville's 
conceptions of democracy, the majority will, and individual constitutional rights. Part 
IV explores his views on federalism and decentralized government. Part V looks at 
Tocqueville's discussion ofreligion and its special importance to democracy. Part VI 
considers his theory of how civic associations are important to democracy and the 
relevance of this principle to contemporary constitutional law. Part VII examines the 
relevance ofTocqueville's analysis of democracy and law to originalist constitutional 
theory. 
I. WHY MODERNS CONSULT THE ANCIENTS 14 
Why do we modems appeal to ancient writers to help address political and legal 
issues? There are several reasons for this, but we should start by recognizing two 
fundamentally different though overlapping perspectives that are engaged in this 
process. First, one may have intellectual motives to discover how the ancients, 
especially writers who have obtained a revered status, addressed their political 
problems, not only as a matter of historical knowledge but also as a matter of under-
standing the flow and disruptions of historical developments and as a basis for a 
comparative analysis of political problems and solutions. But secondly, one may 
also-or in the altemative--have political motives to find some sort of persuasive 
authority or persuasive rhetoric that can support a political position to which a modem 
person is committed. This political perspective of course is the one likely to dominate 
the work of lawyers and law professors when they appeal to ancient writers on 
American politics and law, for intellectual workers in law typically engage in result-
oriented rather than open-ended inquiry. For example, consider the attraction that 
members of the Federalist Society and other strict originalist theorists appear to have 
for pithy statements by James Madison and other Founders that seem to support claims 
of a Second Amendment individual right to guns, 15 a very restricted reading of the 
I 4. In this article I use the term "ancients" to refer to early writers about American democracy and 
constitutionalism, including both Founders and outside observers such as Tocqueville. 
15. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second 
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. I 139, 1208 (1996) (quoting Alexander Hamilton on the meaning of "a well-
regulated militia"); William C. Plouffe, Jr., A Federal Court Holds the Second Amendment an Individual 
Right: Jeffersonian Utopia or Apocalypse Now?, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 55, 14-15 (1999) (quoting Benjamin 
Franklin on the meaning of"militia"). But cf Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage 
of Originalism, 16 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 103 (2000) (describing the more complex context and set of 
constitutional provisions that bear on the meaning of the Second Amendment and suggest contrary 
arguments which oppose the individual right to guns). 
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Commerce power of Congress, 16 or the constitutionality of religiously-based govern-
ment.17 As we examine the specific reasons for consulting the ancients on American 
government and the Constitution, we should keep in mind these perspectives and the 
possibility that investigators (including the present one) may often shift, at times 
imperceptibly, between these perspectives. 
Several reasons to appeal to ancient writers on American government like James 
Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville can be associated with originalist constitutional 
theory, for originalist theory is aided by any persuasive evidence that helps establish 
an original meaning for an abstract term in the constitutional text or the value of such 
meanings. Tocqueville of course was neither a Framer of the Constitution nor writing 
about the original understanding of the text's meaning in late eighteenth century 
America. But his analysis of how American society and government had developed 
during the first forty years of its constitutional government was written close enough 
in time to the adoption of the United States Constitution to arguably provide both (1) 
some indirect evidence of original meanings, and (2) more importantly, a kind of 
feedback evidence about the good consequences of the original Constitution and its 
original meanings. Thus, it seems natural that Tocqueville's writing about democracy 
in America would appeal to originalist theorists, although perhaps different originalists 
will have different reasons. 
First, those who believe in timeless truths about human nature or government or 
in the need for some kind of fixed authority for constitutional law may find comforting 
evidence of such truths or authority when they find it in the writings of revered ancient 
writers. While originalists need not or may not believe in many such truths, one 
timeless truth they do seem to believe in is the notion that law can be law only if it has 
an objective source and meaning on which everyone can agree by applying the same 
interpretive methodology to the abstract provisions of the constitutional text and their 
diffuse contexts. 18 This view, in tum, engenders searches for original meanings of the 
constitutional text as either a matter of linguistic analysis, 19 Framers' intent, 20 or "the 
original understanding" 21 of constitutional provisions among the American public. In 
this approach, the objective determination of the original meaning ofa constitutional 
text becomes dispositive of constitutional meaning. Arguments from precedents and 
principles of constitutional law that are not supported by or consistent with original 
meaning do not count-and these arguments are dismissed as the illegitimate 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586-89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 
Alexander Hamilton on the distinction between commerce, manufacturing and agriculture). 
17. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffiee, 472 U.S. 38, 97-98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting James 
Madison on the establishment ofa national religion). But see Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to 
Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 875 (1986) (refuting Justice 
Rehnquist's argument in Wallace v. Jajfree). 
18. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 
(1971); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). For a contrary view 
about how contested legal and constitutional meanings are constructed from different interpretive 
perspectives, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
19. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MA ITER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). 
20. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY ( 1977); Bork, supra note I 8. 
21. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 40 2007
40 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:l 
imposition of judicial values upon democracy that is essentially identified with current 
legislative majorities.22 
A second reason for constitutional theorists to consult the ancients is to search for 
a more limited but spiritually deeper "ancestral originalism" 23 or, in other words, ideas 
and practices endorsed by the ancients that constitute partial and important evidence 
of fundamental traditions in American history that have continued over time to inform 
constitutional values and practices. 24 Thus, for example, what the Framers said about 
guns and the Second Amendment may not be good evidence of constitutional ancestral 
originalism, for the Second Amendment has not been applied in a consistent fashion 
by the courts to protect a constitutional right to guns against federal or state 
regulations. 25 On the other hand, what James Madison said in Federalist Number 10 
about the role of factions in constitutional government, or what Alexander Hamilton 
said in Federalist Number 78 about the necessity for the power of judicial review, are 
arguably parts of our enduring constitutional traditions. These latter ideas deserve 
consideration in constitutional argument, not as dispositive arguments like strict 
originalist arguments, but as important principles that should be taken into account in 
any situation to which they are relevant. 
A third reason for constitutional theorists to consult the ancients would be to 
search for arguments from "heroic originalism" 26 or, in other words, arguments from 
the wisdom of the Founding Fathers or other revered constitutional commentators like 
Thomas Jefferson who generally are thought to have been masterful political 
theorists. 27 James Madison's ideas about the play of political factions in republican 
government, Alexander Hamilton's views about the power of judicial review, or (for 
some) even the Framers' statements about guns may qualify as arguments for heroic 
originalism that deserve weight because of the political genius of these Framers and 
their particular ideas. As with ancestral originalism, these arguments need not be 
dispositive but are good arguments that should be taken into account. The basic point 
about both ancestral and heroic originalism is that these arguments are more limited 
in nature and less dispositive than originalist arguments of the "timeless truth" type 
that are intended to establish a fixed quality to constitutional law. 
There are significant non-originalist reasons for consulting the ancients as well. 
One is the pragmatic Burkean notion that any successful organization should remain 
cognizant of and stay relatively close to its original principles to ensure that what 
worked for its initial growth and goodness remains a standard for advantageous 
operations. In commenting on how republics could ensure themselves a long 
existence, Niccolo Machiavelli put it this way: 
22. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 18. 
23. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Nonnative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of 
Original Meaning, 8S GEO. L.J. 176S, 180 I ( 1997). 
24. Id. at 1800-03, 1806-16. Cf PIDLIP Boeem, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF 1lffi 
CONSTITUTION 93-167 (1982) (describing a form of constitutional argument from the American 
"constitutional ethos" that does not require but cenainly can be enhanced in particular cases by arguments 
from "ancestral originalism"). 
25. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 
291,319 (2000). 
26. Dorf, supra note 23, at 1803. 
27. See id at 1803-16. 
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There is nothing more true than that all the things of this world have a limit to their 
existence; but those only run the entire course ... that do not allow their body to 
become disorganized, but keep it unchanged in the manner ordained, or if they 
change it, so do it that it shall be for their advantage, and not to their injury ... And 
those are the best constituted bodies, and have the longest existence, which possess 
the intrinsic means of frequently renewing themselves, or such as obtain this 
renovation in consequence of some extrinsic accidents ... [A]nd the means of 
renewing them is to bring them back to their original principles.28 
41 
Original principles can thus serve as a standard for pragmatic gradual Burkean 
change-in effect by requiring that all changes be justified by reasoning about the 
appropriateness of departing from original principles in order to accommodate 
government to changing historical circumstances. 
A second non-originalist reason to consult the ancients is the more radical one of 
contrasting contemporary thought with ancient thought in order to develop a case for 
the advantages of contemporary thought. This approach focuses upon the flaws or 
weaknesses in ancient thought that can become part of a case for doing things 
differently. For example, Benjamin Constant, the nineteenth-century French liberal 
and a contemporary ofTocqueville 's, believed it was important to contrast the "ancient 
freedoms" of positive liberty to participate in government, as in Athenian democracy, 
with the "modem freedoms" of negative liberty or individual rights against state 
regulations in order to promote the cause ofliberalism. 29 
More generally, consulting the ancients like Alexis de Tocqueville can provide a 
sense of detachment from the pressures and passions of immediate political struggles, 
· and thus give us an opportunity or excuse to withdraw somewhat from the struggle and 
reflect dispassionately upon the wisdom of contemporary policy choices. In sum, the 
non-originalist reasons for consulting the ancients each involve incorporating older 
political ideas into a kind of comparative political or legal analysis of contemporary 
issues in order to help determine what should be done. 30 
A final preliminary point should be noted. Whatever the reasons for consulting 
ancient writers like Tocqueville or James Madison, the investigation of ancient texts 
typically discloses historical contingencies that surrounded and influenced the writing 
of these texts as well as complicated intratextual conditions that are embedded in the 
texts.31 These kinds ofhistorical and ideological circumstances ought to figure in any 
28. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, The Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livi us, in THE PRINCE AND 
THE DISCOURSES 99, 397 (Modem Library College ed., Chistian E. Detrnold trans., 1950). 
29. See BENJAMIN CONSTANT, Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments, in 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 170 (Biancamaria Fontana ed., 1988); Mansfield & Winthrop, supra note 2, at xxv; 
WOLIN, supra note 3, at 208, 413-14. 
30. Cf. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION I CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-29 (2000)), 
reviewed in Martin S. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1107-10 (2001) (describing an 
"experiential alternative" that would make use of constitutional history in constitutional argument by 
assessing historical ideas for their relative values and weaknesses). 
31. See generally Rakove, supra note 15 ( describing the textual provisions of the constitution and 
. historical context that speak to the meaning of the Second Amendment and the claimed individual right to 
guns). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 42 2007
42 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:l 
analysis ofTocqueville's ideas about democracy and constitutional law, and the next 
part of this essay begins this examination. 
II. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE'S PROJECT 
Count Alexis de Tocqueville, a young French .civil servant judge, toured the 
United States for nine months in 1831 and early 1832 with his colleague, another 
young civil servant judge, Gustave de Beaumont. 32 Their ostensible or official 
purpose, for which they obtained leave from the French civil service, was to study 
American prison reforms, especially the somewhat different reforms ofNew York and 
Philadelphia prisons.33 But Tocqueville, raised in an aristocratic family and becoming 
engaged in French politics as a liberal committed to individual rights, seems to have 
burned with ambition to make his political mark in France by discovering and writing 
about the new American society and republican government in ways that would 
influence French and, more broadly, European politics, and also promote his political 
career. 34 In considering Tocqueville's project, then, we should keep in mind three 
aspects of its origins: Tocqueville's aristocratic background, which included family 
losses and other setbacks from both the French Revolution and Napoleon's 
government, 35 his growing commitment to nineteenth century liberalism and individual 
rights,36 and his desire to write about America in striking and politically useful ways 
that would develop and promote his political views and ambitions. 37 
Tocqueville's method for examining and understanding America seems based 
upon his desire "to get beneath the surface"38 or, in .Sheldon Wolin's perspective, to 
develop a theory of republican government and democracy that would influence 
political developments in Europe after the French Revolution, Napoleon's reign, and 
the conservative and liberal reactions that had set in across Europe after 1815.39 But 
32. See GEORGE WILSON PIERSON, TOQUEVILLE INAMERICA 10, 30-31 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 
1996) (1938). 
33. See id. at 27-33. American prison reforms in the early nineteenth century featured large-scale 
asylums designed to rehabilitate prisoners by isolating them from society and its influences. New York 
asylums provided for communal work by prisoners during the day, although prisoners were not allowed to 
talk with each other (and silence seems to have been maintained "by the whip") while Philadelphia's 
asylums kept prisoners isolated from each other all the time. See id at 94-100. 
34. See Gordon Wood, Tocquevil/e's Lesson, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 17, 2001, at 46-47. See 
generally WOLIN, supra note 3. 
35. Tocqueville's maternal great grandfather, Malesherbes, defended Louis XVI at his trial, and five 
of his relatives were guillotined during the Republican Terror. Toqueville's father, Comte Herve de 
Tocqueville, and his wife were imprisoned during the Terror and only saved from the guillotine by the fall 
of Robespierre. Thereafter, Herve de Tocqueville's wife suffered from nervous breakdowns and the Count 
obtained important government service only after the fall of Napoleon in 1814. Tocqueville, born in 1805, 
thus had family reasons to be skeptical about modem centralized government power and the democratic 
passions that propelled the French Revolution. See Mansfield & Winthrop, supra note 2, at xix-xx; 
PIERSON, supra note 32, at 14-18. 
36. See Mansfield & Winthrop, supra note 2, at xx-xxi. 
3 7. See PIERSON, supra note 32, at 31; WOLIN, supra note 3, at I 02-31. 
38. PIERSON, supra note 32, at 79. See also id at 32 ('"We are leaving,' wrote Tocqueville, 'with the 
intention of examining, in detail and as scientifically as possible, all the mechanism . . . of that vast 
American society which every one talks of and no one knows."'). 
39. See WOLIN, supra note 3. 
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any good theory must abstract from its context and idealize salient aspects of the 
subject, perhaps in Tocqueville's case even to the extent of presenting a utopian 
picture of democracy in America that would impress European politicians and readers 
and make them notice Tocqueville's political ideas as well as Tocqueville himself. 40 
This basic purpose or perspective of Tocqueville provides an important reason to be 
cautious in assessing his claims about the operations of democracy in America in the 
1830s, let alone the twenty-first century. Idealized theorizing may be good for 
political theory and good for European politics in the nineteenth century, but it also 
may consciously leave out, discount, or simply miss important aspects of American 
society and government in the 1830s. 
Another reason for bringing caution and skepticism to Tocqueville' s claims comes 
from the nature of his and Beaumont's travels in the United States, the kinds of people 
they met and were impressed by, and other sources of information they relied upon. 
To be sure, Tocqueville and Beaumont departed from the usual ''tourist circuit" for 
Europeans who visited the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 
their efforts to understand America and "get beneath the surface," 41 they traveled by 
stagecoach through the great woods of New York from Albany to Buffalo, visiting 
isolated farms, farmers and other inhabitants, including Indians who resided in the 
wilderness of Michigan Territory, as well as traveling to smaller undeveloped cities 
in the interior.42 In addition, they explored the leading cities on the coasts, and the 
interior of the United States via steamboats on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to get 
to New Orleans, eventually returning to Washington D.C. by stagecoach through 
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and the two Carolinas. 43 Nevertheless, Tocqueville and 
Beaumont were members of French society, or its elite, and they were heavily 
entertained and much enjoyed their entertainments in the United States by leading 
members of American society, or its elite. 44 Much of their information and ideas about 
society and government in America came from their discussions with and observations 
of members of the American elite or its ruling classes, whether the subject was the 
operations of government, religion, lawyers, or the effects of democratic government 
on society.45 Another important source on law and government in America for 
Tocqueville, as he wrote Democracy in America after his return to France, were the 
treatises of New York's Chancellor James Kent and Supreme Court Justice Joseph 
Story, especially Story's Constitutional Commentaries. 46 Kent and Story were of 
course distinguished commentators on American law, but they were also conservative 
40. See id. at 165-66, 363. 
41. PIERSON, supra note 32, at 79. 
42. Id (including Detroit, Cincinnati, and Memphis). 
43. See generally PIERSON, supra note 32. 
44. See, e.g., id. at 84-92 (in New York City), 362-72 (in Boston). 
45. See, e.g., id at 390-425 (detailing conversations with Bostonian religious leaders and politicians, 
including former President John Quincy Adams, about the operations of state and national government, law 
and politics, and local government-specially the importance of the New England township, religion, and 
slavery in America). 
46. For a discussion on the influence of Kent on Toqueville, see PIERSON, supra note 32, at 602-07 and 
. JAMES T. SCHLEIFER, THEMAKINGOFTOCQUEVILLE'SDEMOCRACYINAMERICA 100-01 (Liberty Fund 2000) 
(1980). For a discussion on Story, see PIERSON, supra note 32, at 727, 732 and SCHLEIFER, supra, at 122, 
129-3 I. 
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jurists who believed that law should be an important constraint upon democratic 
legislative decisions and democratic excesses.47 Thus, at a time when new economic 
markets and the politics of Jacksonian democracy were transforming the American 
political economy, class structure and culture,48 Tocqueville and Beaumont were 
obtaining their primary information about democracy in America from those who were 
benefiting a great deal from American markets and who tended to be skeptical at best 
about the ideas of popular democracy promoted by Andrew Jackson and his 
democratic movement.49 As we shall see, Tocqueville's ideas about economics and 
democratic politics in America tended to follow the views of his primary sources, and 
this is another reason to be cautious or skeptical of his views. 
With these caveats, let us consider now the structure, main arguments, and key 
findings or assertions in Tocqueville's theory about democracy in America. A 
significant theoretical contri_bution ofTocqueville's was to perceive democracy as a 
social movement rather than as merely a form of government. 50 This sociological 
approach in Democracy in America was established by Tocqueville's basic premise 
that the strongest determinants of the way government and law work within a society 
are the "social state"51 or primary facts of the society or, in other words, its 
fundamental mores and habits. The social state of America, Tocqueville claims on the 
very first page of Democracy in America, incorporates an "equality of conditions" 52 
among its people, or at least among its white males, that exerts an "enormous influence 
on the course of society. "53 It was this equality of conditions, in Tocqueville's view, 
47. See, e.g., JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A STUDY IN 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT (1971); R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: 
ST A TESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC ( 1985). 
48. See CHARLES ELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA 1815-1846 (1991); 
HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1990); ROBERT H. 
WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE ADoPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE EVE OF 
DISUNION (1984). 
49. See, e.g., PIERSON, supra note 32, at 367 (noting Rev. Jared Spark's comment on Andrew Jackson 
"that General Jackson is not made to fill the office of President; his lack of experience in matters relating 
to civil government, and his great age, render him incapable ofit."). 
50. See Marvin Zetterbaum, Alexis de Tocqueville, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 657, 657-78 
(Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey, eds., 1963); see also WOLIN, supra note 3 (arguing that Tocqueville's 
distinctive contribution to political theory lay in his analysis of political cultures as well as the forms of 
government). 
Id. 
51. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 45. 
52. Id. at 3. 
53. Id. Tocqueville goes on to say: 
[T]his primary fact ... gives a certain direction to public spirit, a certain tum to the laws, 
new maxims to those who govern, and particular habits to the governed. 
Soon I recognized that this same fact extends its influence well beyond political mores 
and laws, and that it gains no less dominion over civil society than over government: it 
creates opinions, gives birth to sentiments, suggests usages, and modifies everything it does 
not produce. 
So, therefore, as I studied American society, more and more I saw in equality of 
conditions the generative fact from which each particular fact seemed to issue, and I found 
it before me constantly as a central point at which all my observations came to an end. 
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that had produced or enhanced the particular democratic practices in the United States, 
including those that he praised and those that concerned him a great deal. 
The primary fact or concept of the equality of conditions in America is stated, 
however, only in an abstract or general way, and this finding or concept of 
Tocqueville's seems to be based upon similarly general claims and observations about 
the material security of all Americans: a proportionate distribution of material 
resources among white males (at least by comparison to resource distributions in 
Europe); an openness and availability of resources on the American frontier for those 
who currently lack resources; an asserted equality in manners or relationships among 
persons both rich and poor; an apparent widespread intellectual attitude 9f 
independence and individualism; and-significantly-an attitude among Americans 
about the equal importance of each person, at least in the sense of the equal importance 
of their opinions. 54 But whatever its precise contours, this equality of conditions in 
Tocqueville's view was substantially strengthening the democratic forms of 
government in the United States and in turn was being strengthened by these 
forms-in particular by the frequent cooperative participation of individuals in local 
government work, jury service, and localized civic associations including churches. 55 
Tocqueville's primary concept of the equality of conditions is not only roughly 
defined but also idealizes America of the 1830s in two distinct ways. First, 
Tocqueville recognized that African-Americans, Native Americans and women did not 
share in this equality of conditions, and yet, while critical of these exclusions, he 
accepted them in general and did not let them much affect his analysis of democratic 
government. 56 Second, Tocqueville in Democracy paid little attention to the growing 
economic inequalities in America during the 1820s, the development of the urban poor 
and working classes, and their quite limited social mobility. 57 He recognized in a short 
passage the possibility that an industrial aristocracy could become sufficiently 
powerful to bring about a "permanent inequality of conditions" 58 that would produce 
a class of poor and degraded workers with but "few means of leaving their 
condition. "59 But Tocqueville viewed the state of industrial aristocracy in America in 
the 1830s, perhaps understandably, as "an exception, a monster, in the entirety of the 
social state" 60 and also as "one of the most restrained and least dangerous" 61 of all 
aristocracies. With this characterization, economic and social inequalities essentially 
disappeared from Tocqueville's picture of democracy in America. 
54. See id. at 45-53; Zetterbaum, supra note SO, at 658-60. 
55. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 3, 56-75, 258-64, 485-500. 
56. Tocqueville recognized that slavery might be a future problem for the Union, and he seemed to 
believe that married women's acceptance of their "separate sphere" and subordinate role to husbands was 
actually a strength of American democracy. But beyond that he contented himself with describing these 
three inequalities. See id. at 302-79, 573- 76; Kennedy, supra note 4. 
57. See SELLERS, supra note 48, at 238-39; Sean Wilentz, Many Democracies: On Tocqueville and 
Jacksonian America, in RECONSIDERING TOCQUEVILLE'S DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 207 (Abraham S. 
Eisenstadt ed., 1988). 
58. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 532. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 531. 
6 I. Id. at 532. 
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The concepts of individualism and materialism are two other significant concepts 
that help structure Tocqueville's views of the American social state and democracy. 
Individualism, which tends to isolate individuals from each other (something that 
Tocqueville worries about), reinforces the equality of conditions by supporting the idea 
that everyone's opinion is or should be of equal importance. 62 Paradoxically, though, 
individualism also created uncertainty among Americans about what is true or what 
is right unless their opinions were aligned with the majority opinion in society, and this 
uncertainty and desire for conformity contributed in Tocqueville's view to a mild 
despotism that can take hold of the majority will in American culture and politics or 
more generally in democracies. 63 But in the 1830s, Tocqueville thought that 
Americans had successfully restrained any destructive excessive individualism by 
providing for the "local freedoms" 64 of cooperative participation in both local 
government and many civic associations. 65 One wonders whether the same could be 
said today about the effects of excessive individualism in the context of our much 
changed local governments and civic associations in the United States.66 
Tocqueville also observed that the widespread pursuit of material wealth by 
Americans, which takes place mostly in the marketplace on an individual basis, helps 
to explain both the apparent prosperity of the American economy and the substantial 
American desires for low tax and low regulation governments. 67 But he worried about 
the tendency of democracy, or the equality of conditions in which all persons tend to 
follow majority paths, to favor ''the taste for material enjoyments',68 to such an excess 
that materialism could destroy the soul and limit the possibilities for a satisfactory 
spiritual life. 69 This tendency did not appear problematic in the America of the 1830s, 
but Tocqueville never offered a confident resolution of this possible contradiction 
other than to hope that at least in Europe the traditions of aristocracy and centralized 
governments might maintain some kind of appropriate balance between the nobility 
of great acts that aristocracies made possible and the mundane qualities of democratic 
life. 70 
Several other key findings help structure Tocqueville's view of democracy in 
America. Three such findings relate to his claim, or observation, that American 
62. See id at 479-88. 
63. See id. at 485-86, 661-65. 
64. Id at 487. 
65. See id at 486-87. 
66. On what many local governments can do today to promote rather than restrain excessive 
individualism, see generally Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, IOI MICH. L. REv. 1824 (2003) 
(reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LocAL 
GoVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES (200 I)); and on the changing nature 
of civic associations from the small, diffuse associations of Tocqueville's time to today's much larger 
management-oriented organizations, see generally THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED EMOCRACY: FROM 
MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CMC LIFE (2003); see also Part VI infra for further 
discussion of this issue. 
61. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 199-206 (discussing the desires for low tax governments in a 
growing middle class democracy); See also id at 507-10 ( discussing materialism and its beneficial economic 
effects). 
68. Id at 519. 
69. See id. at 519-20. 
70. See id at 599-604, 673-76. 
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democratic government is a very limited kind of government, especially in tenns of 
centralized regulations adopted by either national or state governments. First, he 
observed that by the 1830s, Americans had developed a strong, historically-driven 
reliance upon local governments to accomplish public tasks, with the New England 
township featured as the paradigm and main evidence of this practice. 71 This reliance 
on local government had encouraged the equality of conditions and other democratic 
values among the populace, who could contribute most actively and most equally to 
their local governments. 72 Importantly, this reliance had also produced a division of 
responsibilities between "government," or legislation, and "administration," or the 
execution of the laws; the former responsibility resided largely with state governments 
. and the latter responsibility, including the administration of state laws, had been 
delegated to township and county governments. 73 Thus, at the local level, citizens 
could participate in government in important ways by selecting and holding 
accountable local public officials with responsibility for administering most state laws, 
and Tocqueville's praise of decentralized government in American democracy focuses 
substantially upon local governments, not states. 
Second, Tocqueville actually says very little about state governments, and he 
seems in general to view them as relatively unstable and limited governments. 
Shifting majorities of voters and legislators tend to change laws and expenditure 
patterns abruptly; outstanding leaders are discouraged from seeking public offices in 
an atmosphere of equality; and over confidence in the power of the majority, which 
assumes the majority's control over public officials, too often leaves public officials 
unsupervised in their actions. The major role of state governments, in Tocqueville's 
account, seems to have been to pass legislation concerning the operation of local 
governments and other laws (for instance criminal laws) that were to be administered 
by local governments. 74 State governments at the time were not much engaged in 
direct economic regulations although they were heavily involved in the complex, 
contentious (and unstable) politics of internal development, constructing turnpikes, 
canals and banking systems. 75 Tocqueville only alluded generally to the complexity 
of state issues in the 1830s, although he certainly viewed the states as an integral, 
mediating part of America's federalist system. But he does not celebrate their powers 
or accomplishments as he celebrates local governments. 
Third, Tocqueville observedthat the national government had been delegated only 
a relatively few powers by the Constitution, including the powers of war, diplomacy 
and maintaining an internal free market among the states. 76 But he also noted that the 
national government of the United States, since the War of 1812, had not needed to 
exercise its external powers because, unlike European States, the United States was not 
threatened by any neighboring foreign power. 77 For Tocqueville, then, the idea and 
success of a limited or weak national government in American democracy were much 
71. See id at 57-63. 
72. See id at 63-65. 
73. See id at 82-93. 
74. See id. at 79-93, 187-205, 235-43. 
75. See WIEBE, supra note 48, at 194-208. 
76. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 107-13. 
77. See id. at 118,265. 
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more a matter of fortunate historical circumstances than wise political theory.78 
Indeed, he worried about the weakness of the federal government and the possibility 
that in times of crisis ( over slavery for example) it would prove too weak vis-a-vis the 
more popular state governments to engage in effective national action. 79 And the 
Nullification Crisis of 1829-1831, when South Carolina threatened to declare void 
federal tariff laws that it deemed too high, was surely reason for Tocqueville to raise 
this fear even though President Andrew Jackson prevailed in this case and South 
Carolina stood down.so 
Two other findings or theoretical assertions are significant in Tocqueville's 
analysis, although these claims are more complicated, more speculative and less 
supported by evidence than his findings about limited central government and activist 
local governments. First, he argued that the democratic forms of government in 
America, those of activist local governments and limited central governments; were 
important to economic prosperity and the operations of a market economy-not only 
because of the relative absence of economic regulations from weak central govern-
ments, but also because activist local governments, in Tocqueville's view, provided 
instructive education for Americans in the entrepreneurial and business skills of 
initiating new projects to solve immediate problems and organizing cooperative 
behavior to implement the projects.s 1 Of course, as Tocqueville recognized, other 
important factors causing American economic prosperity were rich natural resources, 
open frontiers and the character of European immigrants to the United States.82 
Moreover, the American economy from the end of the War of 1812 had experienced 
some marked boom-and-bust cycles, although by the early 1830s it was expanding at 
an impressive rate.83 Tocqueville's views about the relationships between economic 
growth, a limited central government, and activist local governments, while supported 
by the theories of Adam Smith, other contemporary writers, and his own historical 
observations in America, are nonetheless best understood as slender theoretical 
speculations rather than findings in view of the absence of any persuasive empirical 
evidence. Moreover, any relationships between economic growth and the nature of 
78. Id at 118-19; see also PIERSON, supra note 32, at 129-30. Here the author quotes from 
Tocqueville' s letter to E. Chabrol dated June 9, 1831 : 
Id. 
We are a long way from the ancient republics, it must be admitted, and yet this people is 
republican and I don't doubt will long remain so. And the Republic is the best of govern-
ments. 
I can only explain this phenomenon in thinking that America finds itself, for the 
present, in a physical situation so happy that the interest of the individual is never opposed 
to the interest of the whole, which is certainly not the case in Europe. 
Here there is no public power and, to tell the truth, no need of it. The territorial boundaries 
are very limited; the states have no enemies, consequently no armies, no tax, no central 
government; the power of the executive is nothing, it gives neither money nor power. So 
long as things stay thus, who will torment his life to attain it? 
79. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 359-62. 
80. See, e.g., SELLERS, supra note 48, at 326-31 (on the Nullification Crisis). 
81. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 63-65, 233-34. 
82. See id. at 19-44, 266-74. 
83. See SELLERS, supra note 48, at 131-39, 161-70, 343-45, 353-54. 
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government that existed in the 1830s would seem to have little relevance to today's 
economy of large-scale private organizations and large-scale government programs 
that regulate and support these organizations. 84 
Tocqueville also asserted that the religiosity of Americans was an important 
source of democratic success in America, especially because ofreligion 's generation 
or instruction of a widespread morality that supported obedience to laws, discipline in 
the workplace, a tempering of materialist urges, and, thus, more effective uses of 
freedom. 85 Tocqueville accordingly, while praising the separation of church and state 
as a means to enhance universal religious beliefs, 86 commended politicians who 
displayed their religious convictions as a useful means of supporting American 
religiosity in general. 87 Yet Tocqueville's view of religion in America in the 1830s 
seems partial, perhaps too heavily influenced by the establishment churchmen who 
helped entertain Beaumont and Tocqueville in major East Coast cities. 88 Moreover, 
the 1820s and 1830s were a time of religious peace in America when religious 
activities focused on the home and women and there was little public divisiveness 
among America's different religions. 89 In these circumstances, it is perhaps 
understandable that Tocqueville would follow Locke's and Jefferson's vision of 
separate religious and political domains that should rarely if ever be in conflict. 90 
Tocqueville's discussion of American religion in particular ignores or discounts 
the passions and fundamentalism of the Second Great Awakening that was in full 
swing at least in rural parts of America by the 1820s and was beginning to support 
contentious political reforms that would protect the Sabbath and punish drinking. 91 He 
also fails to note the anti-Catholicism aimed at Catholic immigrants in coastal cities 
that was appearing by 1830,92 although anti-Catholicism did not become a major issue 
in American politics until the 1840s.93 Thus, Tocqueville was able to depict a religious 
landscape in America that was pluralistic and tolerant ofreligious pluralism, church-
going but non-dogmatic, to some extent deist, and willing to accept a general idea of 
separation between church and state that included the clergy staying out ofpolitics. 94 
Left out of this discussion or discounted in Democracy in America are different views 
among Americans about the importance of religious doctrine and the appropriate 
84. See PETER H. LINDERT, GROWING PUBLIC (2004) (arguing that high government spending on social 
programs in modem industrial economies creates no statistically significant deterrent to economic growth); 
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAJWA, TAXING OURSEL YES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVERT AX 
REFORM (2003) (asserting that there is no demonstrated empirical relationship between the size of 
government or level of taxes and economic growth in modem industrial economies). 
85. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 275-88. 
86. See id at 283-86, 423-24. 
87. See id at517-21. 
88. See PIERSON, supra note 32, at 62, 68-69, 72-73, 390-416, 458-73, 499. 
89. See WIEBE, supra note 48, at 280-81, 305-06. 
90. See JOHN LocKE, EPISTOLA DE TOLERANTIA:  LETTER OF TOLERATION IO 1 ( 1689) (J. W. Gough, 
trans., Raymond Klibansky ed., 1968); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge et al. (Jan. 1, 
1802) in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984); Michael w. McConnell, 
Religious Souls and the Body Politic, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 2004, at 127, 130-32. 
91. See SELLERS, supra note 48, at 202-36. 
92. See id. at 390. 
93. See Philip Hamburger, Against Separation, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 2004, at 177, 183-84. 
94. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 275-88. 
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relationships between church and state, as well as the significant efforts by religious 
reformers at state and local levels to obtain restrictive regulations that would enforce 
morals upon members of the working and lower classes who were drinkers or were 
licentious or undisciplined. 95 Tocqueville's views ofreligion in America and its demo-
cratic role, like his views of the American economy, thus seem to be idealized in ways 
that might make the religion-democracy connection appeal to his European readers 
without raising concerns about the more problematic and more violent aspects of 
religious politics. In any event, Tocqueville's views on religion and government surely 
do not capture or take account of the powerful, contentious positions that exist today 
in relationships between religion and governments in American politics and law.96 
There are also inherent tensions or contradictions in Tocqueville's larger 
perspectives on democracy in America. The central problem of democracy in 
Tocqueville's view was that democracy's passion for equality was compatible with 
either a tyrannical government, which employed both legislation and administration 
to destroy the freedom of individuals, or a government devoted to the liberty of equal 
individuals. 97 Prescriptively, Tocqueville wanted to show how men can be both equal 
and free, and he proposed a two-part resolution for obtaining appropriate liberties in 
!l democratic society.98 As Melvin Zetterbaum put it, the first part of this resolution 
consisted ofTocqueville's belief, or hope, that the equality of conditions of the kind 
he observed in America engenders in people's minds and hearts "an instinctive 
inclination for political independence" 99 of each equal individual, although this passion 
for "equality in freedom" 100 was itself of unequal strength with a democratic people's 
"passion for equality." 101 The passion for freedom thus needed support from the art 
of politics, which in America of the 1830s had been achieved by the emphasis and 
reliance upon local governments, juries, an independent judiciary, the separation of 
church and state, a very diffuse and decentralized free press, and the importance of 
many civic associations accomplishing publicly useful tasks. 102 
So Tocqueville resolved the contradiction between freedom and equality, at least 
in theory, by relying upon the historical circumstances in America of both a 
widespread equality of conditions that engendered an inclination for liberties, of the 
self if not others, and a broad set of free institutions like the decentralized press, 
decentralized government, and many small civic associations. Certainly his sense that 
American democracy produces a passion for individual liberty has in the main held 
true, although today respect for the liberties of others does not seem prevalent on 
issues like abortion, physician-assisted suicide, gay rights or welfare reform. Yet one 
can say without contradiction, I believe, that the passion for liberty of self has in recent 
years tended to overwhelm any passion for the government promotion of an equality 
95. On the moral reform efforts, especially against drinking, that engaged government regulations at 
state and local levels, see SELLERS, supra note 48, at 259-66; WIEBE, supra note 48, at 230. 
96. See infra Part V. 
97. Zetterbaum, supra note 50, at 659; See also TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 235-49. 
98. See Zetterbaum, supra note 50, at 659, 668-69. 
99. Id. at 668. 
100. Id at 669. 
IOI. Id 
102. Id at 668-69. 
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of conditions in American society. Moreover, the free institutions that in Tocqueville's 
view were necessary to maintain a balance between equality and liberty have changed 
dramatically over the past two centuries, as regulations by state and national 
governments have brought about the administrative state; as first the telegraphic 
revolution and then the televisual revolution have centralized the powers of the press 
and turned the news media to providing many fragmented bits of entertaining news; 
as religions have entered the public sphere with passion and power; and as many civic 
associations have become something like public utilities in their provision of services 
to eager consumers. 103 Some of course would say that some of these developments 
represent the passion for equality overriding the passion for liberty, as Tocqueville 
feared, but the new imbalances of power also trample on equality and serve only the 
liberties of the powerful, as we shall see. 
Another larger perspective that Tocqueville brought to his analysis was 
methodological. His political theory of America and of democracy was consciously 
grounded in a historical and sociological approach, like Montesquieu but unlike many 
previous political theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. 104 On the one hand, 
this suggests that any helpful application of Tocqueville's ideas to contemporary 
constitutional issues should be relentlessly historical and sociological itself. On the 
other hand, Tocqueville's penchant for making generalizations without empirical 
support and for idealizing democracy seems in many places to diminish the accuracy 
and power of his observations of America in the 1830s. These are methodological 
qualifications we need to bring to our analysis ofTocqueville's more specific ideas 
about the interactions of law and society. 
In summary, Tocqueville's central insights into the nature of democracy in 
America included his theory that the social state, or primary social forces, in any 
society play an important role in determining the form and operations of its 
government; that as of the 1830s the social state of America included an equality of 
conditions that meant a rough equality ofattitude and self-esteem, as well as relatively 
equal material opportunities, that supported the democratic forms of government 
Tocqueville observed; that America's social state included strong tendencies towards 
materialism, individualism, and relatively private kinds of religion that on balance 
affected American democracy in favorable ways; and that historical circumstances, 
including the social state, had provided American democracy by the 1830s with strong 
local governments, relatively limited and unstable state governments, and a somewhat 
inoperational national government. Further, Tocqueville's overriding normative 
perspective sought to adjust the appropriate liberties of individuals with democracy's 
passion for equality. This is the context in which we should consider Tocqueville's 
more specific ideas and arguments. 
Ill. DEMOCRACY, THE MNORITY WILL, AND RIGHTS 
When Tocqueville refers to democratic government as distinct from ~emocracy 
as a social movement, he equates "democratic" with the majoritarian process or, in 
other words, with the election of public officials by a majority or plurality of votes and 
103. See infra Parts IV-VI for discussion of these developments. 
104. See WOLIN, supra note 3; Wood, supra note 34. 
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the majority voting by legislators that enables legislative action. 105 At the same time, 
· however, he approves the distinctive American innovation of the power of judicial 
review and the active use of this power by courts to enforce constitutional allocations 
of power between the different branches of government and to protect individual 
rights, particularly property rights, against the excesses or omnip~tence of the 
majoritarian process. 106 Moreover, although he is neither very specific nor technical 
about this, Tocqueville's interpretation of the relationships between the majoritarian 
process, the power of judicial review, the process of judicial interpretation and 
decisionmaking, and. individual rights appears to support a relatively robust and 
flexible judicial recognition ofindividual constitutional rights, especially rights against 
state governments. 
Tocqueville perceived both advantages and adverse effects from a pure democracy 
that is conceived of as both a social movement and majoritarian form of government. 
Among the advantages, which in Tocqueville's view stem in good part from the 
equality of conditions, are the development of a widespread "public spirit" 107 to 
accomplish useful and important government tasks (particularly by actions of local 
governments); a related enthusiasm for cooperative efforts among individuals in civil 
society (by the actions of economic, religious, and other voluntary associations); 
respect for the law ( for among equals, only law can provide social cohesion and order); 
and, importantly, the "idea ofrights" 108 (for among equals, everyone deserves equal 
autonomy). 109 
But there are also vices of a pure democracy, which Tocqueville perceived in 
several forms. First, there is the "legislative instability" 110 from democracy's frequent 
elections that bring "new men to power,"111 and also the "administrative instability" 112 
that results from a majority's tendency to write laws and then shift attention to other 
matters, leaving administrators largely unsupervised. 113 Since most government power 
was exercised by state governments in the 1830s, this criticism seems directed in 
particular against state governments, which possessed relatively more legislative 
power and held more frequent elections than the federal government. Second, 
following Madison, Tocqueville describes and fears the ''tyranny of the majority," 114 
which he defines broadly as the majority's imposition of unjust law upon the interests 
or rights of individuals that causes "freedom to be in peril. " 115 While Tocqueville did 
105. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 235-37. Tocqueville writes, "It is of the very essence of 
democratic governments that the empire of the majority is absolute; for in democracies, outside the majority 
there is nothing that resists it." Id at 235. 
106. See id at 93-98, 133-35, 248-57. 
101. Id at 225-27. 
108. Id at 227-29. 
109. See id. at 220-35. 
110. Id at 238. 
Ill. Id 
112. Id at 198-99. 
113. Id at 238-39. 
114. Id at 239-42. 
115. Id at 239-42. Tocqueville specifies, "I regard as impious and detestable the maxim that in matters 
of government the majority of a people has the right to do everything, and nonetheless I place the origin of 
all powers in the will of the majority. Am I in contradiction with myself?" Id at 240. 
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not perceive much of this tyranny in America of the 1830s, neither did he perceive any 
guarantee against this tyranny; he says only that "one must seek the causes of the 
mildness of government in circumstances and mores rather than in the laws." 116 
Third, official arbitrariness is another vice of democracy that is favored by the 
omnipotence of the majority for, according to Tocqueville, the majority, perhaps 
overwhelmed by its omnipotence, "regards public officials as its passive agents and 
willingly deposits in them the care of serving its designs," without specifying ''the 
details of their duties." 117 Fourth, democracy as a social movement produces the 
milder despotism of the conformity of thought about what is right to shifting, fickle 
majority opinions. Without an authoritative religious or political doctrine, and with 
everyone's opinion equal to everyone else's in a democracy, intellectual uncertainties 
and anxieties about what to believe or what to think produce a herd instinct among 
Americans; only what is authorized by majority public opinion can be truthful or 
useful. Thus Tocqueville says, "[i]n America the majority draws a formidable circle 
around thought. Inside those limits, the writer is free; but unhappiness awaits him if 
he dares to leave them." 118 This conformity of thought discourages high quality 
leadership in public life and is also likely to be a cause of the tyranny of the majority 
and resulting unjust laws that unfairly oppress individuals and their liberties. 119 In 
sum, the vices of democracy can threaten democratic governments in two principal 
ways: by a"[ c ]omplete enslavement of the legislative power to the will of the electoral 
body" and by a "[ c ]oncentration in the legislative power of all the other powers of 
government." 120 These events may override the legitimate rights of individuals in a 
democracy and ultimately produce illegitimate govemment. 121 
Although Tocqueville saw no guarantee against the tyranny of the majority or 
oppressive conformity of thought, he did theorize that three factors in the 
circumstances and mores of American life might temper the tyranny of the majority. 122 
Two of these factors, the absence of administrative centralization and the jury as a 
political institution, will be considered later as shifting features of American 
government and its federalist system. 123 The third factor, lawyers, speaks more directly 
to Tocqueville's theory of rights as an important counterweight to the majority will. 
The lawyer factor included the importance to American government of judges and the 
power of judicial review, and this factor, when combined with Tocqueville's theory 
of democracy, supports the vigorous protection of individual constitutional rights 
against the oppressive conformity of majority opinions that are adopted for no other 
reason than the desire to be right in the eyes of the current majority within a 
democratic society. 
Tocqueville did not develop a full-blown theory about the judicial protection of 
individual constitutional rights, and his perspective on this issue must be constructed 
116. Id at 242. 
117. Id. at 242-43. 
118. Id. at 244. 
119. See id at 235-49, 661-65. 
120. Id at 146. 
121. See id. at 246-49. 
122. Id at 250-64. 
123. See infra Part IV. 
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from several of his observations. First, he praised the special American power of 
judicial review as a necessary constraint upon majoritarian excesses while recognizing 
both the special legal qualities and political importance of this power. 124 He 
recognized, that is, that the power of judicial review is confined to deciding only cases 
and controversies which litigants properly bring before the courts. 125 But he appre-
ciated the political importance of this power in maintaining an appropriate balance of 
power between federal and state governments 126 and in protecting individuals from 
unjust or oppressive laws. 127 
Second, like Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 128 Tocqueville 
recognized that the written Constitution was incomplete at the time of its making due 
to the impossibility of fixing "beforehand, in an exact and complete manner, the 
portion of power that would fall to each of the two governments between which 
sovereignty was going to be apportioned" or foreseeing "in advance all the details of 
the life of a people." 129 The written Constitution thus marks only the great objects of 
government and individual rights, and the details of constitutional law will necessarily 
depend upon reasonable interpretations by the courts to ensure that governments can 
relate appropriately to their changing circumstances. 130 To accomplish this, federal 
judges "must not only be good citizens, educated and upright men-qualities 
necessary to all magistrates," but they must also be "statesmen ... [who] know how 
to discern the spirit of their times, to confront the obstacles they can defeat, and to tum 
away from the current when the flood threatens to carry away with them the 
sovereignty of the Union and the obedience to its laws." 131 
Finally, the interpretive process for constitutional issues will be successful only 
if prudent, statesmen-like judges engage in debate and deliberation over competing and 
shifting principles and weigh these principles in the light of the relevant circumstances 
in ways which ultimately satisfy the sovereignty of public opinion in the long run and 
thereby obtain legitimacy. For Tocqueville: 
In the hands of ... federal judges rest ceaselessly the peace, the prosperity, the very 
existence of the Union. Without them, the Constitution is a dead letter; to them, the 
executive power appeals to resist the encroachments of the legislative body; the 
legislature, to defend itself against the undertakings of the executive power; the 
Union, to have itself obeyed by the states; the states, to repel the exaggerated 
pretensions of the Union; the public interest against private interest; the spirit of 
124. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 93-98, 130-42, 146,257. 
125. See id. at 93-98. 
126. See id. at 107-08. 
127. Id at 257. Tocqueville writes, "Armed with the right to declare laws unconstitutional, the American 
magistrate constantly enters into public affairs. He cannot force the people to make laws, but at least he 
constrains them not to be unfaithful to their own laws and to remain in accord with themselves." Id. 
128. 17U.S.(4Wheat.)316(1819). 
129. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 107. 
130. See id. at 107-08, 141-42. 
131. Id. at 142. In supporting judicial resistance to "the flood" of public opinion that can threaten "the 
sovereignty of the Union and the obedience to its laws," Toqueville was following both Chancellor Kent 
and Justice Story in their support for judicial review that protects constitutional principles against mere 
public opinion. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Marbury and the Retreat from Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 205, 219-20 (2003) (Kent's view); Newmyer, supra note 47, at 114 (Story's view). 
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conservation against democratic instability. Their power is immense; but it is the 
power of opinion. They are omnipotent as long as the people consent to obey the 
law; they can do nothing when they scorn it. Now, the power of opinion is that which 
is most difficult to make use of, because it is impossible to say exactly where its 
limits are. It is often as dangerous to fall short of them as to exceed them.132 
55 
Whatever one may think about the openness or apparent subjectivity of 
Tocqueville's perspective on constitutional judging, 133 it clearly is not consistent with 
either the maintenance-model or legal science approach to constitutional law of Joseph 
Story, who emphasized close textual analysis, historical explications of textual mean-
ings, and reliance on the common law in order to preserve the fundamental principles 
of the founders; 134 or the strict originalist theories of jurists like Roger Taney, 135 
Antonin Scalia, 136 and Robert Bork 137 who have wanted to tie constitutional law to · 
clear and specific original meanings. Perhaps the forward-looking qualities in 
Tocqueville's view of judging suggest that he was endorsing ( or would have endorsed) 
something like Michael Perry's theory about the constitutional interpretation of 
individual rights as a kind of"moral prophecy." 138 But Tocqueville also praised the 
American legal profession for constituting a conservative, "aristocratic," or liberal 
constraint upon the majority will, 139 and his analysis of democracy in America gives 
significant weight to history or time in explaining and understanding public opinion. 
Tocqueville's endorsement of flexible, evolving constitutional interpretation thus 
appears to be more like the jurisprudence of John Marshall, who emphasized reasoning 
from the first principles of government to help rationalize the constitution, 140 and the 
jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, who emphasizes applying moral principles that are 
embedded in legal authorities in order to resolve hard cases in a way that is both 
backward-looking (as a matter of the "fit" between the embedded moral principles and 
constitutional authorities) and forward-looking (as a matter of "justification" by 
132. TOQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 146. 
133. For a negative view, see Matthew J. Franck, Statesmanship and the Judiciary, SI REV. POL. 510 
(1989). 
134. See PAUL w. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GoVERNMENT IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 38-45 (1992) (describing Story's constitutional theory as articulated in Story's 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States); see generally MCCLELLAN, supra note 47 
(describing Story's "common law constitutionalism"). 
135. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399-454 (1857); KAHN, supra note 134, at46-
53; CHARLES W. SMITH, JR., ROGER B. TANEY, JACKSONIAN JURIST 155-76 (1936). 
136. See generally SCALIA, supra note I 9; Scalia, supra note 18. 
13 7. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, 143-160 ( 1990). See generally Bork, supra note 
18. 
138. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 112 ( 1982). 
139. See TOCQUEVILLE supra note I, at 251-58. 
140. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 146-52 (1803) (arguing from the first principles 
of a written constitution to help justify the power of judicial review); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 353 (1819) (arguing from the first principles of the constitutional text and its framing to help 
justify the implied powers doctrine and the authority of Congress to create a national bank); KAHN, supra 
note 134, at 24-31 (describing Marshall's jurisprudence as reasoning from the first principles of 
government). 
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choosing an interpretation of moral principles that would make law ''the best that it 
can be").141 
How might a Tocquevillian jurist today contemplate cutting edge constitutional 
cases that involve restrictions on, say, abortions, homosexuality or pornography? In 
assessing the relationships of these issues to evolving but contested public opinion, the 
majority will, and individual rights, she would in the first place want to take into 
account that "democracy" is both a social movement and a form of majoritarian 
decision-making by government. This would require developing a conception of 
democracy that is more complex and richer than mere majority voting and one that 
makes some fair sense of contemporary democracy as a social movement. This 
conception might incorporate a democratic commitment to the constitutional history 
of the American people, a commitment which engages the courts as a democratic 
rather than anti-democratic institution in preserving the fundamental principles of 
American society as they have been shaped and revealed throughout history by the 
writing of the constitutional text and its major judicial interpretations. 142 Or this 
conception might incorporate a democratic commitment to the idea that a democracy's 
fundamental purpose and obligation are to respect and promote the interests and values 
of all persons, which are best served by resolving issues of basic moral principle (as 
distinct from issues of policy or expediency) through constitutional decisions by the 
courts rather than by majority voting of legislatures.143 Or one's conception of 
democracy might attempt to incorporate and balance both of these democratic 
commitments together with a third democratic commitment to the power of majority 
voting. 144 
More specifically, a Tocquevillian jurist will need to interpret the conflicting 
opinions and social movements that swirl around the constitutional issues of abortions, 
gay rights, and pornography in order to determine what kinds of decisions promise to 
promote an equality of conditions that will support a vibrant healthy democracy. This 
jurist might begin by characterizing these conflicts as integral aspects of America's 
contemporary "culture wars." 145 Justice Scalia of course believes that such conflicts 
should be relegated to legislatures where a rnajoritarian process can decide the winners 
and losers. 146 He asserts, but without elaboration, that the majoritarian process, unlike 
the courts, provides the losers at least with ''the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an 
honest fight." 147 Justice Scalia's metaphor of a playground brawl reveals, however, 
141. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 18. 
142. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GoVERNMENT 172-
74 (2001). 
143. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GoVERNMENT (200 I). 
144. See generally Philip C. Kissam, Triangulating Constitutional Theory: Power, Time, and Everyman, 
53 BUFF. L. REV. 269 (2005) (arguing that three-dimensional constitutional theories, which incorporate and 
balance the three independent values of power, time and everyman, fit best with our constitutional practices 
and are the most attractive kind of theory for democracy). 
145. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 
(1991); Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the issue 
of legal rights for homosexuals as part of a "culture war'' in America). 
146. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603-04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer, 517 U.S. at 
652 (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
147. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, SOS U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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perhaps unintentionally, both the absence of an impartial decisionmaker and the 
likelihood that neither side is listening to the other within the legislative process. 
Allocating such issues to legislatures rather than courts, then, would seem to provide 
a rather strange sort of "fair hearing" and "honest fight" in terms of how we expect 
democracies to proceed. Democratic deliberation over today's hot-button cultural 
issues may be better served by the courts rather than state legislatures. 
Most importantly, these cultural conflicts in public opinion are asymmetric; one 
side wants to impose its opinion on others ( about the time at which human personhood 
begins, or the sanctity ofheterosexual marriages, or the offensiveness of pornography), 
while the other side in these issues just wants to be let alone, free from any majority 
opinion that the democratic forms of government may register and wish to impose 
upon them. In the Tocquevillian perspective, regulations based on majority opinions 
that would merely enforce conformity to a majority public opinion about what is right 
are just the sorts of situations that constitutional law should invalidate unless the 
government can provide convincing evidence of harms to other persons that would 
occur without regulation. In these situations the mild despotism of majority opinions 
in democracies that Tocqueville feared merges with the tyranny of the majority by 
legislative regulations that Tocqueville also feared. Of course, in the 1830s, when 
most constitutionally questionable legislative regulations involved contracts and 
property, Tocqueville seemed to think that opinions alone would restrict morals while 
oppressive legislation would concern property rights. But given the modem merger 
of opinions and restrictive legislation on cultural matters, it seems that the 
Tocquevillian jurist today would want to provide the same robust protection for 
individual social and cultural rights as Tocqueville recommended for property rights 
in the 1830s. 
In the case of abortions, as Justice Blackmun reasoned in Roe v. Wade, 148 the 
argument that abortions cause specific harm to another person reduces to a question 
of faith or opinion-religious or otherwise-about whether ( or when) the fetus is a 
person. 149 Similarly, public opinion that gay marriages may be prohibited without 
violating equal protection or the privacy right under the due process clause seems to 
be based only upon opinions with no convincing showing of specific harms to 
persons. 150 To be sure, it is claimed that heterosexual marriages are necessary to 
promote "the welfare of children and the stability of society," 151 but since such 
marriages have been the only marriages in history there is no evidence that allowing 
homosexual marriages would diminish the welfare of children or social stability. 
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
149. Id. at 161-62. See also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DoMINION (1993); KENT GREENAWALT, 
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLmCAL CHOICE, 112-14, 120-43 (1988); Arnold H. Loewy, Morals 
Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV. 159, 175-81 (2003). Greenawalt and Loewy 
argue that religious faith about the "fact" or "purpose" of when a human life begins deserves consideration 
in constitutional argument because different "faiths" of a similar sort figure into all kinds of factual or 
purposive interpretations in constitutional law. 
150. CJ Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (rejecting the argument that moral opinions about sodomy between 
homosexuals is a justification for banning such sodomy); Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-36 (rejecting argument 
that moral opinions that disfavor homosexuality are justification for prohibiting laws that would protect 
homosexuals from discrimination). 
151. Bush's Remarks on Marriage Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al8. 
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Regulating pornography is a more difficult issue in my view because of the argument 
that pornography of many kinds subordinates women and thus may have a wide range 
of effects that disadvantage women. 152 Regulating pornography may thus tend to 
promote the equality of conditions that is the hallmark ofTocquevillian democracy. 
But even here, given the uncertain nature of pornographic effects and, importantly, the 
weakness ofremedies that are aimed at hard core pornography but leave vast quantities 
of soft core pornography untouched, there is room to conclude that the prohibition of 
pornography essentially would constitute the imposition of majority opinions designed 
to coerce conformity to these opinions. In all three situations, then, the democratic 
measure of equality of conditions that includes respect for the opinions of each person 
may be satisfied by judicial decisions that invalidate government restrictions that are 
based merely on majority opinions about the harms of abortions, homosexuality, and 
pornography. 
The Tocquevillian perspective on constitutional rights throws light on other issues 
as well. Consider, for example, the religion clauses. Under the free exercise clause, 
regulations with a purpose or animus to disadvantage particular religious practices are 
unconstitutional, 153 and this rule clearly is aimed at preventing majority religious 
opinions from justifying coercive regulations of non-conforming views. But overtly 
secular government actions, like building a road over an Indian burial site in a national 
forest 154 or applying drug laws to the religious use of peyote, 155 may or may not be 
animated by a distaste among public decision-makers for minority religious beliefs and 
practices. It would be appropriate, therefore, for courts to apply heightened scrutiny 
to such actions in order to "smoke out" illegitimate cases of animus or bad purpose 
while leaving alone legitimate secular decisions. 156 Although a narrow majority of the 
Supreme Court seemed to hold otherwise in Employment Division v. Smith, 157 the 
Court's subsequent readiness to find religious animus in the face of claims about 
secular purposes in Church of the Lukumi Baba/u Aye 158 suggests that the Court may 
be willing to smoke out cases that have been animated by conformity-seeking majority 
religious opinions even without a formal rule of heightened scrutiny. This would be 
a Tocquevillian resolution. 
Under the Establishment Clause, recent Supreme Court decisions have revealed 
a Court interested in continuing to invalidate officially sponsored religious exercises 
in public schools, is9 but willing to allow substantial public funding ofindividuals who 
152. See Catherine A. MacKiMon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 
I (1985); see also Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1993) (on 
the perfonnative or imperative aspects of pornographic speech that subordinate women). 
153. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
154. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
155. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
I 56. See RUBENFELD, supra note 142, at 206-07 (interpreting the concept of strict scrutiny in 
constitutional law as designed to smoke out illegitimate purposes). 
157. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that city ordinances that prohibited animal sacrifice were violations 
of the Free Exercise Clause). 
158. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
159. See, e.g., Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992). 
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choose religious forms of education that include religious practices. 160 The first 
situation, in essence, involves various kinds of officially sponsored prayers in public 
schools that, in effect, impose a conformity-seeking majority opinion or just the sort 
of mild despotism of majority opinions that Tocqueville decried. Non-conforming 
students are not formally coerced by officially-sponsored prayers into praying with 
others, but they are exposed to implicit criticism by the majority for their non-
conforming views if they refuse to participate. In the second situation, however, there 
is no direct coercion or criticism of non-conforming individuals unless one considers 
the payment of taxes that support religious views to be coercive on the taxpayer in 
some relevant constitutional sense. 161 Here too we see apparent Tocquevillian 
resolutions of difficult constitutional issues that would promote the equality of 
conditions in contemporary American democracy. 
IV. DEMOCRACY AND FEDERALISM 
Tocqueville clearly perceived decentralized government as a foundational aspect 
of American democracy. 162 The focus of his analysis, however, was much more on 
local governments rather than state governments. 163 In Tocqueville's view, local 
government provided opportunities for individuals to participate in policy-making and 
administration, enhanced the potential accountability of office holders to voters, and 
allowed the construction of appropriate government responses to diverse local 
conditions and problems. Active local governments, including local courts and the 
jury system, also promoted an entrepreneurial and cooperative spirit among the people 
that spilled over into civil society and the economy, thus enhancing both the 
democratic and economic prosperity of Americans outside the formal bounds of 
government. State governments, on the other hand, were described with some 
ambivalence. These governments, especially their legislatures, embodied the 
democratic idea of majority rule and the freedom of individuals to participate in 
government, 164 and they provided "strong governmental centralization" in terms of 
adopting general laws, including laws to help organize local governments, 165 that was 
necessary to address the "multiple and complicated" rights and duties that state 
160. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding the constitutionality of school 
vouchers for private religious schools). 
161. Whatever the constitutional sense about this kind of tax payment may have been at the founding of 
the constitution, it seems like a weak argument today given the many kinds of tax payments to which one 
might constitutionally object, but to no avail, and especially given the Establishment Clause precedents, 
which since Everson v. Bd of Educ., 330 U.S. l (1947), have allowed public funds to provide indirect 
support to religious practices when the funds are provided directly to support the secular activities of 
religious programs. 
162. See, e.g., TOQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 56 (''The great political principles that govern American 
society today were born and developed in the state; one cannot doubt it. It is therefore the state that one 
must know to have the key to all the rest."). 
163. See id. at 56-93. Tocqueville devotes much more discussion to local governments and their 
relationship to the states than to the nature of state governments and describes townships, counties, and state 
governments as "three sources of action that could be compared to the various nervous centers that make 
the human body move." Id at 56. 
164. See id. at 236-37. 
165. Id. at 83. 
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governments faced in the American system.166 But Tocqueville perceived that states 
had granted excessive power to their legislatures and electorates, 167 and that this power 
could become the site of oppressive legislation adopted by fickle, unstable majority 
opinions or, in other words, a central site for "the tyranny of the majority." 168 
It thus would be wrong to think that Tocqueville's appreciation of decentralized 
government provides plentiful support for arguments on behalf of states' rights or state 
powers against the national government in the kinds of federalism issues that the 
Supreme Court has had to deal with throughout our constitutional history. It would 
also be wrong to think that Tocqueville believed that the power of states in American 
federalism somehow justifies judicial deference to state legislatures whenever "the 
majority will" desires to regulate individual behavior. Three themes in his analysis of 
decentralized American government in the 1830s suggest that Tocqueville's 
perspective on American federalism was quite different from the one that states' rights 
advocates imagine. 
First, as noted, Tocqueville's emphasis on decentralized government focused on 
active local or township governments and paid relatively little attention to state govern-
ments.169 It was in local governments, especially the paradigmatic New England 
township meeting, and the jury that Tocqueville located the merits of decentralized 
government: participation, accountability and education in entrepreneurial and 
cooperative actions. Moreover, the Frenchman's knowledge and experience of 
centralized French government helped him perceive that a major feature of American 
state governments lay in their separation of"government," or lawmaking, for which 
state legislatures were responsible, from "administration," or the enforcement oflaws, 
which tended to be delegated to county and township officials, thus enhancing the 
responsibility and activities oflocal governments vis-a-vis the states. 170 As some of 
Tocqueville's informants told him, democracy in America consisted essentially of a 
linked group of local republics or small city-states or, in other words, local 
governments, which had pre-existed and helped construct state governments and thus 
established the distinctive character of American government. 171 
Second, Tocqueville clearly appreciated the principle of subsidiarity-the 
principle that central government authority should act, and only act, when a 
government function cannot be performed competently at a more local level. 172 But 
166. Id. at 107. 
167. Id. at 236 (describing the short terms and similarity of representatives in both houses of state 
legislatures and the diminished executive and judicial powers). 
168. See id. at 235-49. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75, 163. 
170. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note l, at 82-93. See also SCHLEIFER, supra note 46, at 129-3 7 ( describing 
Tocqueville's discovery of this important distinction). 
17 l. See PIERSON, supra note 32, at 405-13 ( describing the influence of Josiah Quincy, President of 
Harvard University, and the Reverend Jared Sparks, a historian and publisher of the North American Review, 
on Tocqueville's thinking about the importance oflocal governments, especially the New England township, 
to American government). 
172. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note l, at 107-08; Andrew Koppelman, How "Decentralization" 
Rationalizes Oligarchy: John McGinnis and the Rehnquist Court, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 11, 12 (2003); 
Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. I 03, 142 
(200 I). James Madison in Federalist # 14 recognized in a general way the principle of subsidiarity as part 
of the American constitutional structure. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON, THE 
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of course this principle is not the same as the principle of state sovereignty-the 
principle or idea that constitutional law should protect some core notion ofindependent 
state government functions from national regulation. The principle of state sovereignty 
has been used by the Supreme Court to justify its contemporary constitutional 
limitations on national government in cases like United States v. Lopez,' 73 United 
States v. Morrison, 174 New York v. United States, 175 and Printz v. United States 116 that 
have carved out domains of regulatory activity that are reserved for the states free from 
national regulation. In fact, the principle of subsidiarity endorsed by Tocqueville 
would place the responsibility of deciding what functions to delegate to states, and 
what functions to regulate by national laws, primarily in the hands of the national 
legislature rather than the courts because the national legislature would appear to be 
the most appropriate body for determining when national regulations are needed to 
address social problems and when functions may be delegated. 177 
Third, Tocqueville does not seem to have thought very highly of the capacity of 
state governments to govern wisely, innovatively, or experimentally as states' rights 
theorists like to claim. State governments in Tocqueville's account tended to be 
relatively unstable and weak due to the frequency of state elections, populist politics 
at the state level, frequent shifts in voter opinions, and the tendency of American 
politics and its "equality of condition" attitudes to drive exceptional leaders away from 
politics and government. 178 He also noted the inherent popularity of state governments 
by comparison to the more distant national government, and he worried that in times 
when the exercise of strong national powers should become necessary that the national 
government might not have either the legitimacy or power to claim and execute such 
powers successfully. 179 Tocqueville thus never endorses any strong principle of state 
sovereignty, nor does he particularly applaud state policymaking. Local governments, 
juries, and administrative decentralization of state governments are featured instead 
as the foundational aspects of American federalist government and democracy. 
The relevance to modem constitutional law ofTocqueville's distinctive take on 
American federalism may seem unclear but at least two observations are pertinent. 
First, at the beginning of the twenty-first century local governments are still an 
important, often overlooked part of American government, although they no longer 
resemble Tocqueville's paradigm of the New England town meeting with its small 
size, its homogenous polity, its substantial possibilities for citizen participation, the 
close accountability of public officials, and the education of citizens for participation 
in the larger civil society. Local governments today tend to be relatively large and 
FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 82 (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) 
("The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other objects which can be 
separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity."). 
173. 514 U.S. 549 (I 995) (invalidating a federal "gun free school zone" act). 
174. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating a federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence). 
175. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating a federal law regulating the disposal of low-level radioactive 
waste by state governments). 
176. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating a federal law requiring the temporary use of state and local police 
officers to check information on gun purchasers while a new federal gun-control program was established). 
177. See generally Koppelman, supra note 172. 
178. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 238-43. 
179. See id. at 348-79. 
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impersonal organizations that serve diverse, complex and multi-cultural constituencies 
by administering complex regulatory schemes that rarely engage citizens other than 
as subjects of regulation. Similarly, notwithstanding its often mythic presentation in 
popular culture, the jury today hardly seems to be a center of democratic education 
when juries have reduced powers (by comparison to the early 1800s when, for 
example, juries decided questions oflaw as well as fact and decisions notwithstanding 
the verdict were unheard of), 180 many persons desire to flee jury service, and most 
persons who are called to jury service are never empanelled. 181 Tocqueville praised 
the relative autonomy of local governments in the 1830s, but today's complex forms 
of local government would appear to deserve relatively close judicial supervision in 
many cases in order to protect several types of constitutional rights. 
For example, the significant local government agencies that tend to serve 
relatively homogenous populations in suburban areas often arrogate state powers to 
coerce conformity among their residents, to exclude others from the community by 
exclusionary zoning measures, and to retain control of the property tax as a local 
privilege. 182 In this context, the close constitutional supervision oflocal governments 
that courts often provide under the free speech, free exercise, due process and equal 
protection clauses 183 and the constitutional supervision of public school financing that 
some state courts have provided 184 make good sense in terms of ensuring the basic 
fairness and inclusiveness of local government operations. The policymakers and 
administrators of local governments are likely to be operating under the pressure of 
particular interest groups and taxpayer demands for efficiency or low taxes that 
displace any traditional local government concerns for basic fairness and the interests 
of all persons. 18s Furthermore, appreciating the close and intertwined modem 
relationships between state and local governments and applying careful judicial 
scrutiny to these relationships, as many state courts have done in school financing 
litigation186-but as the Supreme Court failed to do in its leading school financing case 
of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 181 and its leading urban/ 
180. See Rachel Bartow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury s Constitutional Role in the Era of 
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 66-69 (2003). 
181. See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Jury Duty? Prepare for Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at Bl. 
182. See Schragger, supra note 66. 
183. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Bablu Aye, Inc. v. City ofHileah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (applying 
free exercise analysis to a city's ban on animal sacrifices); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989) (applying equal protection analysis to a city's affrrmative action contracting program); Frisby 
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (applying free speech analysis to a city's ban on picketing before residential 
properties); Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (applying due process analysis to a 
zoning regulation prohibiting a grandmother living with two grandchildren who were cousins). 
184. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 V AND. 
L. REV. JOI (1995); Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Co"al: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the 
Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1021 (2006); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and 
Money, 109 YALE L. J. 249 (1999). 
185. See EISGRUBER, supra note 143, at 87-96. 
186. See Enrich, supra note 184; Levy, supra note 184; Ryan, supra note 184. 
187. 411 U.S. I (1973) (denying an equal protection challenge to unequal public school financing in 
Texas that relied basically on the local control of property taxes for school financing). 
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suburban school desegregation case of Milliken v. Bradley 188-would appear to be an 
important area of local and state government that deserves close judicial supervision. 
In these various conditions, the principle of subsidiarity suggests that federal and 
state courts rather than local governments or permissive state legislatures may be the 
effective agencies to ensure a constitutionally fair provision of government services. 
To be sure, standards to promote an equality of conditions in suburban zoning and 
public school financing are not easy to ascertain. But courts can at least invalidate 
egregious situations of inequality in these arenas and promote democratic discourse 
about constitutional fairness by forcing state legislatures to consider and provide 
regulatory schemes that are less unequal. 
The Tocquevillian perspective on American federalism also invites talcing a 
second look at the New Federalism cases decided by the Rehnquist Court. When 
Congress enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 189 it appears to have made 
no finding under the principle of subsidiarity that state and local governments could 
not adequately use their criminal and civil laws to regulate and sanction guns in 
schools. 190 Thus, the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez 191 that Congress did 
not have constitutional authority to invade the state's traditional criminal law functions 
is perhaps a useful signal to Congress to take federalism and the principle of 
subsidiarity seriously and not to act merely on the basis of political grandstanding. 192 
The tenuous theoretical case for connecting the possession of guns in schools to 
interstate commerce, although one could be made, 193 allowed the Supreme Court the 
freedom to send this federalism signal to Congress that traditional state functions, 
which have seemed to work adequately under the subsidiarity principle, should not be 
lightly dismissed or regulated by Congress without good cause. 
But under the principle of subsidiarity, the constitutionality ofnational legislation 
looks quite different in three other cases: United States v. Mo"ison,' 94 New York v. 
United States 195 and Printz v. United States. 196 The federal laws challenged in these 
cases were adopted only after Congress considered the potential increased 
effectiveness of new federal laws to supplement or mandate state actions and, at least 
in the cases of Mo"ison and New York v. United States, a large number of state public 
officials agreed with the need for the new laws. Moreover, each of these cases could 
be justified under Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce much more easily 
than the gun-free school zone law at issue in Lopez. In Mo"ison, Congress adopted 
a federal civil remedy for gender-related violence after findings (supported by many 
state Attorneys General) that state laws against domestic violence and rape were not 
188. 418 U.S. 717 (I 974)(limiting inter-district school desegregation remedies for racially discriminatory 
acts that are a substantial cause of inter-district segregation, despite the state's overall responsibility for local 
school districts). 
189. 10 u.s.c. § 922(q) (1990). 
190. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995). 
191. Id. at 549. 
192. See Boeerrr, supra note 24, at 190-9S (describing the cueing function of judicial review as 
illustrated by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). 
193. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
194. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
195. S05 U.S. 144 (1992). 
196. 521 U .s. 898 ( 1997). 
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working adequately to protect women and additional findings that at least some women 
hesitated to travel or take jobs interstate because of their fears of urban violence. 197 In 
New York v. United States, Congress passed a law forcing certain policy decisions by 
states regarding the disposal of low-level radioactive waste after states had failed to 
agree among themselves on depository states and state governments had negotiated 
with Congress for the new law.198 In Printz, Congress had required state and local 
police and sheriff officers to temporarily assist the federal government in the 
establishment of background checks on gun purchasers, to make the law effective 
before a fully-run federal system could be established. 199 Tocquevillian federalism and 
the subsidiarity principle appear to support contrary results to those produced by the 
originalist theorizing of the Supreme Court's majority in each of these cases. 
V. DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION 
Tocqueville saw and praised religion as another foundational aspect of American 
democracy, especially because of religion's capacity to generate a morality that 
supported social order, obedience to democratic laws, discipline in the workplace, and 
spiritual desires that could mitigate democracy's incentives towards pure individualism 
and materialism. 200 He also alluded in a general way to the role of religious dissenters 
who settled the American colonies as forming part of the point of departure for the 
creation of America's democracy. 201 In fact, ifTocqueville, a committed Catholic, had 
been able to explore the dissenting Protestant traditions in American religions during 
the colonial, revolutionary and early republican eras more fully, he might have been 
able to make a more specific case that the anti-authoritarian attitudes and practices 
among dissenting Protestant sects constituted a significant cause of the equality of 
conditions and democratization of American society and government. 202 
But Tocqueville's views on American religion and government were idealized and 
based firmly on the historical circumstances of the 1830s. His views about religion 
certainly do not support the turn to "political religion" that has occurred in the United 
States today, 203 nor do they support all the constitutional claims that are made today 
on behalf of political religion. 204 Tocqueville's views on religion thus deserve a 
careful examination, both for their possible insights and to guard against their possible 
197. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
198. See New York, 505 U.S. at 150-51. 
199. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-04. 
200. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 274-88, 417-26, 517-21; supra text accompanying notes 85-96. 
201. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 29-30, 276. 
202. See generally NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY (1989); 
See also Gordon S. Wood. Religion and the American Revolution, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN 
RELIGIOUS HISTORY 173, 187-91 (Harry s. Stout & D.G. Hart eds., 1997). 
203. On the nature of "political religion" and its presence in modern politics, see MARCELA CRISTI, 
FROM CIVIL TO POLITICAL RELIGION: THE INTERSECTION FCULTURE, RELIGION AND POLITICS I 10-14 
(2001); Dwight B. Billings & Shaunna L. Scott, Religion and Political Legitimation, 20 ANN. REV. Soc. 
173, 175-81 (I 994). 
204. On the potential for contemporary political religion to influence a good deal of modem 
constitutional law, see, GREENAWALT supra note 149, at 112-14; MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? 
RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003). 
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misuse when they are taken out of context to support contemporary ideas about the 
proper role of religion in politics. 
Although Tocqueville did not distinguish between the concepts, he in effect 
recognized, two different kinds of religious phenomena as important to the healthy 
functioning of American democracy. One was the widespread existence of pluralistic 
"private" religious beliefs that can be associated with the many different churches and 
other religious institutions in America. These beliefs, practices and institutions, 
Tocqueville argued, are important to democracy because they generate a strong mora-
lity among the public that laws should be obeyed, that individuals should be ethical in 
their relationships to others, that restraints on materialist desires are appropriate, and 
that individuals have duties to themselves, their families, and their God to become and 
remain both politically free and disciplined prosperous workers. Democracy, the 
economy, and individuals can thus prosper with this sort ofreligious-backed morality 
in the background. 205 Moreover, widespread religious pluralism in Tocqueville's view 
supports a pervasive tolerance for religious diversity and general acceptance of ''the 
separation of church and state," even or especially among American Catholics about 
whose place in American society the Catholic Tocqueville seems to have been 
particularly interested. 206 Tocqueville noted approvingly, for example, that the 
American clergy including Catholic priests approved of ''the separation between 
church and state" and that the clergy refrained from politics, or at least from running 
for public offices.207 He also noted with approval the relative lack of dogmatism in 
American religious beliefs. 208 These various restraints on religious ideas and practices 
supported the tolerance of religious pluralism and absence of religiously-motivated 
political divisiveness in America. 
Tocqueville's view of private religion in America in the 1830s is an attractive one 
but is also idealized. He and his companion Beaumont, visiting mostly in large 
American cities and entertained by the urban elites, appear to have essentially 
overlooked or discounted the Second Great Awakening of the 1820s and 1830s and its 
effects in educating many Americans in dogmatic fundamentalist beliefs and 
encouraging political movements at state and local levels to legislate the morality of 
drinking and sexual behavior. 209 He also made no mention of the anti-Catholic 
sentiments that were beginning to be raised against Catholic immigrants to American 
cities by the 1830s.210 Nor had public schools and the conflicts between public and 
Catholic schools developed by the 1830s into the caldron of religious disputes that 
would occur later in the 19th and 20th centuries. Tocqueville's depiction of private 
religion then could easily separate politics and law, on the one hand, from religious 
beliefs and practices on the other. Private religion conflicting with issues in the public 
205. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 275-82, 422-24, 517-21. 
206. See id. at 275-77; PIERSON, supra note 32, at 68-69, 72-73, 137-38, 155-56, 298-300. 
207. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 283-86; 423-24. 
208. Id. at 423. 
209. On these political movements stimulated by the Second Great Awakening, see SELLERS, supra note 
48, at 259-68. 
210. On anti-catholic sentiments in America of the 1830s, see id. at 387, 390-91, 393. 
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sphere was simply never a problem or significant constitutional issue in Tocqueville's 
analysis. 211 
Tocqueville also appears to have been attracted by a second religious concept as 
well-that of civil religion. This concept, first defined by one of Tocqueville's 
mentors, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 212 is that a government's legitimacy is enhanced by 
a widely-shared public belief-or profession of faith-that a "beneficent Divinity" 
oversees civil government, punishes the wicked, enforces the sanctity of the social 
contract and the laws, and rejects religious intolerance that makes civil government· 
more difficult in a diverse society. 213 This public or civil religion is a different 
phenomenon from private religion-it is less dogmatic, more general, and aimed at 
political and civil life rather than an individual's salvation. Such a public or civil 
religion, Rousseau believed, was necessary to educate the public in the virtues of 
republican or democratic citizenship. Indeed, Rousseau thought this idea so important 
to good government that he advocated imposing civil religion by coercion against any 
competing private religions. 214 Tocqueville did not follow Rousseau in advocating 
civil religion by coercion, nor did he even employ the term "civil religion." But he did 
consider religion to be a political institution and emphasized that the democratic and 
republican nature of Christianity in America supported a government devoted to the 
liberty and equality of individuals. 215 He also commended political leaders to promote 
religion and teach citizens to "know, love and respect religious morality," especially 
by setting a good example in acting "every day as if they themselves believed" in "the 
immortality of the soul" and by "conforming scrupulously to religious morality in great 
affairs."216 
The traditions of such a civil religion have continued from the 1830s until today, 
especially in terms of the implicit requirement that American politicians display some 
kind of personal religious belief as a necessary credential or condition for election to 
public office. 217 But the civil religion in Tocqueville's idealized view of American 
religion in the 1830s has turned into or been largely displaced by a kind of political 
religion in the modem era-where politically oriented religious leaders are willing 
participants in the political arena on issues that range from abortion to homosexuality 
to the death penalty, where religious leaders and believers invite or even demand 
satisfaction from politicians on specific political positions, and where politicians feel 
obligated to appeal in explicit, dogmatic terms to their religious bases. 218 As with 
211. See supra text accompanying notes 85-96. 
212. On Rousseau's general influence upon Tocqueville's political thought, see Mansfield & Winthrop, 
supra note 2, at xxxvi-xxxix; WOLIN, supra note 3, at 171-72; Wilhelm Hennis, In Search of the "New 
Science of Politics, " in INTERPRETING TOCQUEVILLE'S DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 27, 40-48 {Ken Masugi 
ed., 1991). 
213. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 186-87 (Maurice Cranston ed., Penguin 
Books 1968)( 1762). 
214. See id.; CRISTI, supra note 203, at 17-30. 
215. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 275-77; CRISTI, supra note 203, at 81-83. 
216. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 521. 
217. See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in RELIGION IN AMERICA {William G. McLaughlin 
& Robert N. Bellah eds., 1968); Billings & Scott, supra note 203. 
218. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Vatican Exhorts Legislators to Reject Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 
1, 2003, at A I; Kerry, Candidate and Catholic, Creates Uneasiness for Church, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, 
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Tocqueville's analysis of private religions, his concept of civil religion and its 
relationship to American democracy needs questioning and reconstruction if it is to be 
a useful and attractive concept for contemporary constitutional law. 
How should American constitutional law treat the modem tum to political 
religion? Should all religious views and votes be counted equally with the views and 
votes of others in determining public regulations, operating public programs, and 
making judicial decisions, as some would maintain? Or should only public reasons 
that are accessible to all persons be recognized in the construction oflaw? Or should 
some middle ground be sought and maintained? 219 
Tocqueville's perspective on democracy, religion, and the relationships between 
them suggests three overlapping principles. First, the general moral support that 
private religion can provide to a democracy suggests that constitutional law (and 
political discourse) should not be employed to discourage citizens, voters, and 
legislators from expressing and voting upon their religious convictions to the extent 
they wish to do so.220 In Michael Perry's words, we should in general be 
"inclusionists" rather than "exclusionists" or "agnostics" with regard to the expression 
ofreligious discourse in the public sphere, 221 and both the speech and religion clauses 
of the First Amendment would seem to demand nothing less. But this is not to say, as 
some would, that government officials, legislators, or judges should be able to justify 
any official action by relying on their religious convictions. For religious convictions, 
like any other kind of conviction, should have to withstand not only the majoritarian 
process of legislatures but also the constitutional process of judicial review in the 
courts. If the expression of religious convictions for particular government actions is 
merely evidence of the imposition of majority religious convictions upon others, such 
expressions may constitute evidence of an Establishment Clause violation. 222 Or if 
such expressions are only evidence of the imposition of majority moral views upon 
others, these expressions may constitute evidence of due process or equal protection 
violations. 223 In other words, in the Tocquevillian perspective, religious views in 
constitutional law do not deserve more protection or more judicial deference than other 
moral views that are simply part of a conformity-inducing majority public opinion. 
at A 1 (reporting on a task force of American bishops considering guidelines on relations with Catholic 
politicians, Catholic criticisms of John Kerry for voting for abortion rights, and the refusal by the 
Archbishop of St. Louis to offer communion to John Kerry); Bishop Would Deny Rite for Defiant Catholic 
Voters, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2004, at Al 6. See also CRISTI, supra note 203, at 187-221; Billings & Scott, 
supra note 203 (both describing civil and political religion in contemporary America). 
219. Compare GREEN Aw ALT, supra note 149 (advocating an expansive reception ofreligious convictions 
in politics and law), with JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996) (arguing that politics and law should 
be based only on public reasons). 
220. See GREENAWALT, supra note 149; PERRY, supra note 204. Cf Philip C. Kissam, Let's Bring 
Religion into the Public Schools and Respect the Religion Clauses, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 593 (2001) 
(proposing ways in which religious discussions might be brought more fully into public schools, including 
the curriculum, without violating either the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses). 
221. See PERRY, supra note 204, at ix-x, 35-44 (supporting inclusion of religious ideals in political 
discourse). 
222. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 592-93 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 51-52 
(1985); Loewy, supra note 149. 
223. See supra Part III. 
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Second, Tocqueville's perspective on religion and democracy would surely 
disfavor discriminating between religious expressions and convictions, on the one 
hand, and secular expressions and convictions on the other. For one thing, as just 
indicated, religious and secular moral convictions that support government actions 
should be treated the same way, included in our political discourse but incapable of 
justifying laws that merely impose majority moral views upon other persons. 
Conversely, individuals wishing to pursue religious beliefs and interests in the course 
of their education or other public programs should not be denied public funding when 
other individuals qualify for funding to support their pursuit of equivalent secular 
beliefs and interests. 224 To be sure, the Supreme Court recently upheld a state's denial 
of public funding to a graduate theology student under the state's establishment 
clause. 225 But this decision can be justified not only by the federalism principle of state 
sovereignty, as expressed in a state's constitution, but also by the more specific 
distinction between a student pursuing her own religious beliefs and interests and a 
government's determination that a particular pursuit is likely to support the 
institutional practice of religion. 226 Prohibiting government support, legal and 
financial, for organized religious practices was a core concern of the Establishment 
Clause,227 and this is also a basic idea that underlies Tocqueville's endorsement ofa 
general separation between church and state.228 
Third, with religious expressions protected and encouraged by the first two 
principles, the third principle sets a contrary course by turning analysis towards a 
consideration of the "mild despotism" of majority opinions in American democracy 
that encourage conformity. Although these opinions, when nothing more, are simply 
a discouraging feature of American democracy, when such opinions, religious and/or 
secular, constitute the effective justification for conformity-inducing laws, the laws 
should be invalidated as violations of the Due Process, Equal Protection or 
Establishment Clauses. 229 Political religionists will of course argue that such decisions 
discourage or discriminate against religious expression and convictions by overturning 
their effects. But this ignores the special circumstance where opinion and morality are 
used asymmetrically to seize government power and enforce upon others conformity 
to the moral views of the majority. Tocqueville's democracy would guard against this 
possibility. 
224. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (no Establishment Clause violation by the 
public provision of vouchers for private religious schools where vouchers are provided for public schools 
and other private schools); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (no 
Establishment Clause violation by including a student religious publication in a publicly-funded student 
activities program). 
225. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
226. See id at 719. 
227. See, e.g .• LEONARD w. LEVY, THE EsT ABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
89, 95-97, 175 (1986). 
228. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 282-88. 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 142-161. 
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VI. DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS 
Tocqueville also admired American civil society, or the role that private and civic 
associations play in promoting democratic politics and economic prosperity. Narrowly 
defined, civic associations may be thought of as non-economic organizations such as 
churches, reform societies, cultural organizations, amateur sports organizations and ad 
hoc groups that assemble to accomplish specific projects. 230 But Tocqueville did not 
distinguish between non-economic and economic private organizations in his praise 
for how private initiative and private diversity was encouraged by American 
democracy, especially local governments, and enhanced the success and prosperity of 
both American politics and the American economy. The proliferating civic 
associations in America, in Tocqueville's view, complemented or supplemented 
government actions (thus limiting the need for government actions and spending), 
helped guard against abuses of government power (particularly by the means of a 
diffuse critical press), powered the American economy, softened the harshness of 
market calculations by business and the people who managed and worked within these 
businesses (this was a particular value of religion), and enriched the lives of 
individuals by providing spiritual benefits, diverse activities, and outlets for 
cooperating with others in performing socially valuable acts.231 
Tocqueville only alluded generally to the constitutional implications that arise 
from the value of civic associations. He recognized the American press as a "free 
press" by comparison to the European media of the times,232 but regulations of the 
press were not an issue during the early years of the American republic apart from the 
Alien and Sedition Act controversies in the late 1790s which Tocqueville did not 
consider. He also recognized in a general way and approved of the role oflawyers and 
the American judiciary in protecting property and contract rights from unreasonable 
majoritarian regulations. 233 But the more specific constitutional implications of 
Tocqueville's perspective on civic associations, like his views on constitutional 
interpretation and individuals rights, must be drawn out or pieced together from 
different aspects of his analysis. 
Tocqueville' s analysis certainly justifies careful judicial protection under the free 
speech clauses of the many kinds of "political speech" that can be critical of 
government, and this is what the modem Supreme Court has in the main aimed to 
provide. 234 Yet the American media today is no longer as decentralized as the 
localized printing press of the 1830s, and it purveys its messages by the suasive, 
diffuse, and fragmented forms of television, radio, and the Internet in addition to the 
230. See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 48-64 (2000). 
231. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 172-80, 489-500. 
232. Tocqueville noted that the American press by the 1830s was extremely decentralized by comparison 
to the European press, in part because the decentralization of American government invited or required local 
commentary on local government business, and that the American press was much more valuable for its 
negative or critical commentary on government actions than for its positive commentary on social mores 
which tended to reinforce the mild despotism of majority opinions in American democracy. See id. at I 72-
80. 
233. See id. at 93-98, 130-38, 251-58. 
234. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
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printed word. 235 As Neil Postman has argued, the "telegraphic revolution" which 
started in the 1840s, and then the photograph, the radio, the phonograph, and 
ultimately television have transformed public discourse--taking it from a 
''typographic" focus upon the systematic or sustained presentation of information and 
ideas upon which a reader can act (in local government for example) and transforming 
it into a very fragmented, visually oriented form of entertainment that acts upon 
passive viewers who perceive or have no or few opportunities for responsive actions. 236 
Furthermore, the capitalist development of the media since Tocqueville's time has re-
structured the media into large, profit-sensitive bureaucracies with considerable market 
power and many motivations to please mass popular audiences, corporate advertisers, 
and policy-makers. 237 
The rough equality of conditions that might have existed among speakers, writers, 
listeners, and readers in the public discourse ofTocqueville 's America surely no longer 
exists, and yet the modern conditions of powerful media monopolies and the influence 
of money on public discourse have in general not been recognized by contemporary 
free speech jurisprudence. Constitutional rights to political speech in the media have 
been prescribed by narrowly drawn statutes and disfavored in significant cases that, 
if otherwise decided, could have led to greater equality of conditions among opposing 
sides in political issues and campaigns. 238 The Supreme Court's general protection of 
money as speech ever since its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo239 has gutted major 
campaign finance regulations and hardly seems designed to promote an equality of 
conditions in modern American politics. 24° Furthermore, both commercial advertising 
235. See JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS: How THE MEDIA UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
47-73 (1996); NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PliBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW 
BUSINESS 35-42 (1985). 
236. See POSTMAN, supra note 235, at 64-80. Perhaps the Internet may transform public discourse once 
again, and a typographic focus in internet communications certainly seems possible. On the other hand, 
Internet communications with a typographic focus require hard work to produce and to consume, and the 
power of the televisual revolution may still dominate this new forum ultimately. 
237. See generally J. FALLOWS, supra note 235; Randall P. Bezanson, The New Business of News, 28 
HUM. RTS. 20 (2001). 
238. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a state law that 
required newspapers to give free reply space to political candidates whom they had attacked in their 
columns); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) 
(holding no general constitutional right of access to the airwaves beyond narrowly defined rights of reply 
to personal attacks and political columns as prescribed by statute or administrative regulation); Syracuse 
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the FCC's 1987 decision to repeal 
the "fairness doctrine," a requirement that broadcasters give fair coverage to both sides of public issues that 
was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,369 (1969)). See 
generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1188-1204 (7th ed. 2004) 
(surveying free speech rights of access jurisprudence). 
239. 424 U.S. l (1976). 
240. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 1055, l 055-56 (1999). For discussion of particular instances where Buckley v. Valeo has vitiated 
campaign finance reforms, see Christopher J. Ayers, Comment, Perry v. Bartlett: A Preliminary Test for 
Campaign Finance Reform, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1788 (2001); Matthew S. Crisimagna, Note, The Narrow 
Application o/Buckley v. Valeo: Is Campaign Finance Reform Possible in the Eighth Circuit? 64 Mo. L. 
REV. 437 (1999); Nathan Huff, Note, Landell v. Sorrell: Lessons Learned from Vermont's Pending 
Challenge to Buckley v. Valeo, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 239 (2003). The Supreme Court's recent decision in 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (540 U.S. 93 (2003), applied the doctrines of Buckley v. Valeo 
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and pornography are obtaining substantial First Amendment protection today, where 
again the power of persuasive visual images may have particularly anti-democratic 
effects upon largely passive audiences. 241 In a Tocquevillian perspective, these various 
kinds of constitutionally protected speech and rejections of Constitutional rights for a 
more equal public discourse appear to allow imbalances of power that seem likely to 
promote the mild despotism of majority opinions and unlikely to promote a greater 
equality of conditions in contemporary America. 
The disappearance of an even rough equality of conditions in the American 
economy since the 1830s also suggests that Tocqueville's general approval of 
protecting property rights against majoritarian legislation should not be applied in a 
straightforward manner to constitutional law. To be sure, government regulations or 
regulators may at times treat individual property owners or small businesses unfairly 
in the rush to achieve public purposes with limited budgets, and the courts may be 
justified in striking down such actions. 242 But the modern rule that courts should defer 
to policy judgments by legislatures and administrative agencies as long as their 
economic regulations are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose 243 
seems sound in the Tocquevillian perspective. In view of the substantial and 
increasing inequalities of economic power in contemporary America, providing 
legislative and administrative bodies with ample discretion to act in ways that just 
might mitigate some of these inequalities and promote some kind of equality of 
conditions would be to promote Tocqueville's conception of democracy. 
Regarding civic associations more narrowly, how should modem constitutional 
law treat the constitutional rights of associations such as the Boy Scouts 244 or parade 
organizations which are subject to complaints under anti-discrimination laws for 
excluding particular groups? 245 In his article on Tocqueville and the Rehnquist Court, 
John McGinnis suggests that Tocqueville's appreciation of diverse local norms 
generated by autonomous civic associations helps to explain and justify the Court's 
recognition of First Amendment freedom of association expressive rights that protect 
such associations from anti-discrimination laws.246 But McGinnis's argument lifts 
Tocqueville's praise of civic associations quite out of context and disregards the 
somewhat leniently in upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and this decision possibly 
represents a recognition by some Supreme Court Justices that there is a constitutional need to allow more 
effective legislative regulations to promote equality in voting. 
241. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N. Y., 447 U.S. S57 (1980) 
(prescribing a general intermediate scrutiny rule for protecting commercial speech against government 
regulations); Am. Booksellers Ass'n Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 198S) (protecting pornography). 
For critiques of these decisions, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Public Utilities in the Marketplace of Ideas: A 
Fairness Solution for a Competitive Imbalance, 1982 WISC. L. REV. 43 (1982); Steven Shiffrin, The First 
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 1212 ( 1983); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B .. U. 
L. REV. 793 (1991). 
242. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, SOS U.S. 
1003 (1992). 
243. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carotene 
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
244. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
24S. See Hurley v. lrish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., SIS U.S. S57 (1995). 
246. See McGinnis, supra note 4, at 526-43. 
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inequality of conditions that seems to affect many non-profit civic associations today 
just as much as private economic organizations. His argument ignores the context and 
premise for praising American civic associations in the 1830s -the rough equality of 
conditions among Americans of the time which manifested itself in many diverse, 
pluralistic, and localized civic associations in which many citizens participated in co-
operative and democratic ventures. McGinnis' s argument thus ignores the transforma-
tion of American civic associations since that time, first into the large face-to-face 
membership organizations of the early 20th century, like the Boy Scouts and League 
of Women Voters, and then into our many modem subscription organizations that are 
run by managers, oriented towards lobbying governments, and where dues are paid by 
members, some letters or emails are perhaps written, and members are expected to do 
little else. 247 Certainly some of these organizations, especially large membership 
organizations like the Boy Scouts and St. Patrick's Day parade organizations in large 
cities, appear to wield a kind of monopoly power over particular cultural activities that 
many Americans desire. 248 These organizations also benefit substantially from 
government support-not only in terms of municipal willingness to support large-scale 
parade organizations but more generally in terms of tax benefits for donors to civic 
associations and the provision of the free use of many public facilities. Such civic 
associations, far removed from Tocqueville's conception, would seem to constitute a 
particular kind of public utility. It thus seems reasonable from a Tocquevillian 
perspective to allow the application of anti-discrimination laws and broaden the 
democratic possibilities for individuals to participate and express themselves within 
the cultural activities that are promoted by these very public kinds of organizations. 
VII. DEMOCRACY AND ORIGINALIST CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Originalist constitutional theory, or the idea that constitutional law should stick 
closely to the original meanings of the constitutional text, has become popular today 
among both judges and many constitutional scholars. 249 The impact of this theory can 
be found in numerous decisions of the Rehnquist Court. It is manifest, for example, 
in the Court's recent decisions that have protected state governments from federal 
regulations, 250 limited national regulations under the commerce power by the principle 
that traditional areas of state regulatory functions should be respected, 251 and limited 
the constitutional right to privacy under the 14th Amendment's due process clause. 252 
These decisions and others can also be justified by arguments that somewhat resemble 
247. See PIJTNAM, supra note 230; SKOCPOL, supra note 66. 
248. See Koppelman, supra note 172, at 27-29 (describing the power of the Boy Scouts to crush 
dissenting views within the organization). 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 3-11. 
250. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment 
prohibits Congress from authorizing certain kinds of private suits against state governments); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 ( I 992) (stating that the federal government may not commandeer state officials 
or mandate state policy decisions). 
251. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
252. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); MichaelH. v. GeraldD.,491 U.S. 110 (1989); 
Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665 
(1987). 
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Tocqueville's ideas about federalism, religion, civic associations and the values of 
localized social norms.2s3 Thus the Rehnquist Court has recognized that democratic 
voters deserve the opportunity to hold local officials accountable for local government 
actions under our federal system;2s4 that democratic voters deserve the opportunity to 
have their representatives vote for legislation that regulates complex social/moral 
issues like the right to die on the basis of majority votes and majority opinion; 2s5 that 
state governments have certain traditional or core regulatory functions such as the 
enforcement of basic criminal law and the provision of education that should be 
protected from national regulations;2s6 and that civic associations like the Boy Scouts 
deserve constitutional protection from anti-discrimination rules.257 Originalists might 
understandably perceive close connections between these results and the political 
theories of Alexis de Tocqueville about democracy in America. 
For several reasons, however, these connections are misconceived. First, 
originalist theory's conception of democracy as a form ofmajoritarian voting, first by 
voters and then by representatives, that is limited only by "clear" and "specific" values 
in the original text is much too sparse and formalistic to match Tocqueville's much 
richer conception of democracy, which focuses upon both the forms of government 
and underlying social conditions. Thus originalists simply ignore Tocqueville's 
emphasis upon the "equality of conditions" and other social mores of Americans in the 
1830s in his analysis of democracy, and they ignore too the consequences of these 
social forces such as the mild despotism and tyranny of majority opinions that simply 
seek to impose conformity with themselves. 2ss More generally, originalists also ignore 
Tocqueville's attention to shifting historical circumstances, which would enrich our 
analysis of both democracy's operations and constitutional law. Tocqueville's 
conception of democracy and his method of analyzing democracy, in sum, support a 
contemporary constitutional law that would be quite different from the one that 
originalist theory prescribes. 2s9 
Second, Tocqueville's approved theory or method ofconstitutional interpretation, 
as inferred from his specific observations about constitutional law, is not at all like 
originalist interpretive theory. As described above,260 Tocqueville believed that 
constitutional interpretation needed to fill in "the details" under the general principles 
of the constitutional text, that a shifting or flexible interpretive method was preferable 
to match constitutional law with changing historical circumstances, and that 
accordingly judges would have to act at times in a prudent, statesmanlike manner, to 
read the social forces of democracy as it were in order to constrain and guide public 
opinions in a reasonable manner. This approach to constitutional interpretation is a far 
cry from what originalist constitutional theory proposes: that judges (somehow) can 
253. See generally McGinnis, supra note 4. 
254. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,920 (1997). 
255. Cf G/ucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719. 
256. Mo"ison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (dealing with criminal law); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (dealing with 
education and criminal law). 
257. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000). 
258. See generally McGinnis, supra note 4. 
259. See supra Parts III, IV and VI. 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 128-141. 
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be bound tightly by the original meanings of the constitutional text in order to allow 
the majoritarian forms of government maximum opportunities to legislate as they wish. 
Finally, and importantly, asking Tocqueville's fundamental questions about the 
social forces of democracy in play at the time when constitutional issues must be 
addressed, about the nature ofregulatory legislation and its relationship to the possible 
mild despotism of majority opinions in American democracy, and about the proper 
application of the subsidiarity principle in allocating powers between the national and 
state governments, produces quite different results from originalist constitutional 
argument. These results, I have argued, fit a richer, more attractive conception of 
democracy in action, Tocqueville's conception, than the formalistic originalist 
conception of providing maximum discretion for the elected or majoritarian forms of 
government. In any event, theories of constitutional law and constitutional 
interpretation should to an extent fit existing practices and should to an extent produce 
results that comply with our substantive sense ofjustice. 261 In the end, then, this essay 
invites its readers to choose between Tocquevillian and originalist conceptions of 
American democracy and constitutional law. 
261. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REv. S3S, S49-62 
(1999). 
